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Abstract
My thesis examines the value of truth in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. The 
thesis has two parts. The first part focuses on Nietzsche’s critique of what he 
calls the unconditional will to truth, or the conviction that nothing is more 
valuable than truth. I start by elucidating all the senses of the unconditional will 
to truth, and then turn to the substance of Nietzsche’s critique. I detail the 
reasons for this critique—Nietzsche’s view that the unconditional will to truth 
denies the nature of both the world and human beings—and reconstruct the 
genealogical method that Nietzsche uses to expose the unconditional will to 
truth’s internal inconsistencies. Nietzsche’s critique undermines the 
unconditional status of the will to truth, and opens it up to revaluation. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on Nietzsche’s revaluation of truth. I start 
by arguing that Nietzsche revalues truth as the driver of rigorous critical inquiry. 
I show how the notion of honesty is key to this valuation of truth, so much so 
that Nietzsche designates it one of his four cardinal virtues. Nietzsche 
differentiates between this new virtuous honesty—epitomised by himself and 
the so-called free spirits—and a more traditional type of honesty akin to 
sincerity, by using two different German words. An analysis of the contexts in 
which Nietzsche uses these terms allows me to paint a detailed picture of their 
respective meanings. Finally, I explore the role Nietzsche gives to art in helping 
the free spirits maintain their honesty and truthfulness. Furthermore, I show how 
creative activity generally, in particular value creation, answers two of 
Nietzsche’s concerns associated with the demise of the unconditional will to 
truth—how to provide life with meaning and affirm it in all its horror. 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Introduction
Perhaps Nietzsche’s most famous pronouncement, from The Gay Science, is 
that God is dead, but that his shadow is still to be vanquished. This shadow is 
evident in what Nietzsche calls the unconditional will to truth, the conviction that 
nothing is more valuable than truth. Truth acquired unconditional status from its 
close association with God. God’s commandment against false testimony made 
the need to tell the truth a moral imperative. Despite the rise of atheism, 
Nietzsche finds the conviction that nothing is more valuable than truth alive and 
well at the heart of science, as its driving value, but one that is at odds with 
science’s critical spirit and naturalistic explanations. Worryingly, the 
unconditional valuation of truth also perpetuates the ascetic ideal, a life-denying 
affective and conceptual system of thought associated with Judaeo-Christian 
religion. Nietzsche subjects the unconditional will to truth to critical scrutiny, and 
questions whether truth should indeed have unconditional status. The first part 
of the thesis is an exposition of Nietzsche’s critique. 
In chapter one, I examine the passages of the published works in which 
Nietzsche discusses the unconditional will to truth. The salient features I identify 
it as having are: that it is a conviction founded on a moral injunction against 
deception; that it is contrary to what Nietzsche calls an intellectual conscience, 
in brief, an interrogative or critical stance towards beliefs and judgments; and 
that it is a byword for the ascetic ideal. In chapter two, I review Nietzsche’s 
reasons for critiquing the unconditional will to truth. These reasons boil down to 
two life-denying desires—for the world to be radically different from the way it is, 
and for us to be radically different from the way we are, especially our need for 
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falsification to make the world habitable. In chapter three, I focus on Nietzsche’s 
genealogy of the unconditional will to truth, reconstructing his account of its 
origination and evolution to demonstrate how it is essentially self-negating. It is 
the unconditional will to truth’s refinement into the intellectual conscience that 
leads to the repudiation of Christian morality and the loss of the unconditional 
will to truth’s grounding. Therefore the time is ripe for the unconditional will to 
truth itself to undergo critical scrutiny to determine what value it has for life. The 
second part of the thesis focuses on Nietzsche’s revaluation of truth. 
I start part two, in chapter four, by arguing that Nietzsche values truth principally 
as the driver of critical inquiry, over and above any particular result of such 
inquiry, because it is critical inquiry that overturns life-inimical judgments and 
prevents new judgments calcifying into dogma. This is in keeping with 
Nietzsche’s rejection of truth in the traditional correspondence sense as 
absolute and eternal, and his conception of truth as perspectival interpretation. 
Furthermore, I show how Nietzsche’s valuation of truth as the driver of critical 
inquiry is evident in the positive value he assigns the intellectual conscience, 
whose sceptical, interrogative spirit crystallises in scientific methods. Such 
methods are upheld by Nietzsche himself, and by his free spirits, who are 
characterised by their insatiable curiosity and scrupulous honesty.
In chapter five, I demonstrate the important role that honesty plays in 
Nietzsche’s valuation of truth as the driver of critical inquiry. This is honesty as 
the frank and unflinching expression of the way things are. It is characterised by 
intellectual curiosity and a commitment to critical inquiry to the point of self-
inflicted cruelty. Nietzsche makes this newer type of honesty one of his four 
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cardinal virtues, differentiating it from an older, more traditional sort of honesty 
characterised by sincerity, a closed mind and self-serving self-deception. 
Nietzsche differentiates between these sorts of honesty by using two different 
German terms, whose contexts I analyse to provide an account of their 
respective meanings. Maintaining the newer type of honesty is a punishing task, 
but one that can be invigorating for insatiably curious types such as Nietzsche 
himself and the free spirits. However, the realisations it gives rise to could lead 
them to the brink of illness and suicide were it not for the power of art to falsify, 
or aestheticise, reality.
In the sixth and final chapter, I examine the tension between Nietzsche’s virtue 
of honesty, and the value he places on art as mitigating honesty’s unwelcome 
effects. I argue that honesty and art are not mutually exclusive, but compatible, 
with art allowing the maintenance of truthfulness and providing a model of 
human cognition that Nietzsche sees as conducive to solving problems, 
including philosophical problems. Nietzsche envisages the final self-overcoming 
of Christian morality in terms of a union of artistic practices and scientific 
methods, in which the toxic view of reality that the latter reveal is rendered 
palatable by the refinements of art, to the extent necessary for health and 
wellbeing. 
Crucially, there is one form of creation that Nietzsche sees as filling a void in 
meaning left by the self-overcoming of Christian truthfulness and the implosion 
of the ascetic ideal. It was the conceptual component of the ascetic ideal that 
provided much-needed meaning for man’s existence. Scientific interpretations 
do not provide existential meaning by themselves, but art, conceived generally 
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as creation, does. Nietzsche sees that the creation of personalised values 
informs individuals’ goals and actions, invests the world with meaning, and 
allows them, and indeed mankind, to grow and flourish. Honest individuals take 
full account of their needs and experiences to avoid creating values rooted in 
self-deception. Similarly, character stylisation requires an honest account of 
individuals’ strengths and weaknesses before the application of artistic 
techniques renders the overall effect pleasing. I demonstrate how, for 
Nietzsche, such honest creative activity is expressive of genuine life affirmation. 
I close the thesis by providing a comprehensive overview of Nietzsche’s inquiry 
into the value of truth.
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Part I: Nietzsche’s Critique of the Unconditional Value of Truth 
Chapter 1. The will to truth
I start my investigation of Nietzsche’s critique of the unconditional value of truth 
by considering what he means by his oft-repeated expression the will to truth. 
As Scott Jenkins notes, there is disagreement among Nietzsche scholars over 
the meaning of this expression (Jenkins 2012: 266). To resolve this 
disagreement, it will be helpful to carefully examine the passages in the 
published works in which Nietzsche discusses the will to truth. These passages 
are the fifth book of The Gay Science, titled ‘We Fearless Ones’; the first part of 
Beyond Good and Evil, titled ‘On the Prejudices of Philosophers’; and the third 
essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, titled ‘What is the Meaning of Ascetic 
Ideals?’. Drawing on these texts, I identify four features of the unconditional will 
to truth: i) that it is a faith or conviction; ii) that it is contrary to what Nietzsche 
calls an intellectual conscience; iii) that it is a moral injunction against 
deception; and iv) that it is dependent on what Nietzsche terms the ascetic 
ideal. 
Nietzsche’s exposition in The Gay Science and On the Genealogy of Morals 
makes plain that the unconditional will to truth is the conviction that truth is the 
primordial value of all values. In the former work, Nietzsche asserts that science
—a domain that is ostensibly hostile to faith—is founded on ‘the unconditional 
will to truth’, defined as ‘the principle, the faith, the conviction’ that ‘[n]othing is 
needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-
rate value […] that truth is more important than any other thing, including every 
other conviction’ (GS: 344). The unconditional will to truth therefore equates to 
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the maxim ‘“truth at any price”’ (ibid.). Nietzsche provides a similar definition of 
the unconditional will to truth in On the Genealogy of Morals, where he says that 
‘it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth’ (GM III: 24). 
The ‘unconditional’ in ‘the unconditional will to truth’ pertains to two different 
aspects of the will to truth. Firstly, it pertains to the value of truth, as opposed to 
falsity or untruths, or as Bernard Reginster puts it, ‘the content of that will, that 
is, the unconditional value assigned to knowing the truth’ (Reginster 2013: 453). 
The unconditionality means that truth is more important than all other values, 
and that it does not derive its value from any other values. Simon May’s four 
‘axioms of “the will to truth”’ are helpful in understanding what it means for the 
value of truth to be unconditional (May 1999: 151). The axioms are as follows: 
‘(1) Truth is always more valuable than falsity. 
(2) Truth-seeking is always more valuable than any other activity. 
(3) Truth-telling is always more valuable than deception (whether of myself 
or others). 
(4) Other activities are valuable […] only insofar as they enhance truth-
knowing, -seeking, or -telling’ (ibid.).
Secondly, the ‘unconditional’ pertains to the belief in the supreme value of truth, 
or as Nietzsche writes, the ‘belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be 
criticised’ (GM III: 25). Nietzsche regards beliefs as ‘a considering-something-
true’ (WTP: 15). Therefore belief in the proposition ‘truth is unconditionally 
valuable’ is a normative commitment to the truth of that proposition. As 
Reginster notes: ‘The commitment to the value of truth is […] “unconditional,” 
s ince there can be no be l iev ing wi thout under tak ing such a 
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commitment’ (Reginster 2013: 447). For example, Nietzsche notes that people 
who take themselves to be free thinkers, or ‘free spirits’ as he calls them, are 
actually anything but free in thought because they ‘still have faith in truth’ (GM 
III: 24). It is the unconditionality of this faith that prevents them being free spirits: 
‘it is precisely in their faith in truth that they are more rigid and unconditional 
than anyone’ (ibid.). The two aspects of the unconditionality of the will to truth 
can therefore be summarised as the will to truth is an unconditional belief or 
conviction in the unconditional value of truth. 
Nietzsche says that those who uphold the will to truth—‘“men of knowledge”’, 
including atheists and sceptics—have an ‘intellectual conscience’ and insist ‘on 
intellectual cleanliness’ (ibid.). Elsewhere, Nietzsche uses the term 
intellektuellen Rechtschaffenheit, which translates as intellectual integrity or 
honesty (A: 12). An intellectual conscience is the preserve of a select few. It 
involves submitting each and every belief to critical scrutiny through a 
painstaking examination of the evidence for and against before deciding 
whether to adopt or reject it:
‘the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience [...] does not 
consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly, 
without first having given themselves an account of the final and most 
certain reasons pro and con, and without even troubling themselves about 
such reasons afterward: the most gifted men and the noblest women still 
belong to this “great majority”’ (GS: 2). 
The ability to submit beliefs to such rigorous examination marks the essential 
difference between free thinkers and ‘fettered spirits’ (HAH 1: 225). The free 
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thinker, with his ‘spirit of truth-investigation’ ‘demands reasons’ whereas the 
fettered spirits ‘demand faith’ (ibid.). Importantly, such critical scrutiny of beliefs 
is a continual and never-ending process that is the responsibility of each 
individual. For Nietzsche, any judgment is only ever temporary, and always 
liable to revision, however strong the belief in it. For example, he notes: ‘At 
times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some 
call them henceforth their “convictions.” Later—we see them only as steps to 
self-knowledge’ (BGE: 231). 
We must guard against beliefs turning into convictions if we are to be 
intellectually conscientious. Convictions are antithetical to an intellectual 
conscience because they signal a lack of independent critical scrutiny. Hence 
Nietzsche writes that: ‘Convictions are prisons. They do not see far enough, 
they do not see things beneath them: but to be permitted to speak about value 
and disvalue one must see five hundred convictions beneath one—behind 
one’ (A: 54). The ‘man of conviction’, with his need for incontrovertible 
judgments—‘some unconditional Yes and No’ as Nietzsche puts it—is weak of 
will, and reliant on preexisting convictions rather than his own intellect to guide 
his existence (ibid.). Yet being intellectually honest involves making ‘every Yes 
and No a question of conscience’ (op. cit. 50). In fact, rather than settling for yes 
and no at all, Nietzsche suggests we should only ever settle for maybe. 
Nietzsche sees that the philosophers of the future will trade in ‘dangerous 
maybes’ (BGE 2). 
The upshot is that there is at least one point about which the men of knowledge 
are not intellectually conscientious—their conviction that truth is unconditionally 
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valuable. This conviction enjoys unconditional status and has not been 
subjected to the critical inquiry that an intellectual conscience demands. As 
Nietzsche sums this up in book four of The Gay Science: ‘what gives you the 
right to consider such a judgment true and infallible? For this faith—is there no 
conscience for that? Have you never heard of an intellectual conscience? A 
conscience behind your “conscience”?' (GS: 335). 
As I mention above, Nietzsche takes the conviction that ‘truth is more important 
than […] every other conviction’ to be the founding principle of science. Yet as a 
conviction, it is contrary to scientific method and inquiry. Hence Nietzsche 
writes: ‘Would it not be the first step in the discipline of the scientific spirit that 
one would not permit oneself any more convictions?’ (op. cit. 344). The 
conviction would be all very well if truth and only truth was useful to mankind. 
Yet Nietzsche sees untruth as also being useful: ‘Precisely this conviction could 
never have come into being if both truth and untruth constantly proved to be 
useful, which is the case’ (ibid.). I expand on Nietzsche’s view of the utility and 
value of untruths in the next chapter. The important point here is that 
Nietzsche’s belief that untruths are useful, indeed essential, to life leads him to 
argue that the founding principle of science—the will to truth—is not based on ‘a 
calculus of utility’ at all, but on a moral injunction against deception (ibid.). 
Specifically, the will to truth is tantamount to a desire not to deceive others or 
ourselves: ‘“will to truth” does not mean “I will not allow myself to be deceived” 
but—there is no alternative—“I will not deceive, not even myself”; and with that 
we stand on moral ground’ (ibid.). Yet for Nietzsche, deception is an intrinsic 
part of life and thought, an idea I return to in the next chapter.
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Nietzsche believes that the moral injunction against deception originally evolved 
from a fear of being deceived by others. Nietzsche does not explain in GS: 344 
exactly where this fear of deception came from, apart from saying that we think 
that it is ‘harmful, dangerous, calamitous’, but his notebooks suggest an answer. 
If someone in society is prone to deceive and dissimulate, it means they are 
unknowable and unpredictable, and therefore could be dangerous. The 
‘demand for truthfulness’ arises from the attempt to counteract this danger:
‘Within a herd, within any community […] the overestimation of truthfulness 
makes good sense. Not to be deceived—and consequently, as a personal 
point of morality, not to deceive! […] In dealing with what lies outside, 
danger and caution demand that one should be on one’s guard against 
deception […] Mistrust as the source of truthfulness’ (WTP: 278).
This is part and parcel of our desire for the world to be stable and predictable, to 
minimise the anxiety that the opposing conditions occasion us. Such anxiety is 
a form of suffering: ‘contradiction, deception, change—causes of suffering! […] 
the will to truth is […] merely the desire for a world of the constant’ (op. cit. 585). 
At first glance, this evolutionary explanation seems to cast doubt on Nietzsche’s 
insistence that untruth is necessary for survival, a charge I attempt to deflect in 
my reading of Nietzsche’s conception of truth and untruth in chapter four.
The final aspect of the will to truth I highlight is its relationship to the ascetic 
ideal. Nietzsche says that the will to truth is ‘faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even 
if as an unconscious imperative’; and that the will to truth is ‘sanctioned and 
guaranteed by [the ascetic] ideal alone (it stands or falls with this ideal)’ (GM III: 
24). The ascetic ideal is ‘one of the most widespread and enduring of all 
phenomena’ (op. cit. 11). It is a ‘closed system of will, goal and interpretation’ 
   of  15 121
that manifests itself in our principal systems of thought, namely, religion and 
science (op. cit. 23). The term science (Wissenschaft) is shorthand for all 
scholarly subjects, including the natural sciences.
There seem to be two components to the ascetic ideal: an affective component 
and a conceptual one. The affective component takes the form of a deep-seated 
repulsion or aversion to the world and everything in it. This results in a desire to 
transcend life. Hence Nietzsche defines the ascetic ideal as: 
‘this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of 
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of 
happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, 
change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself—all this means—let 
us dare to grasp it—a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion 
against the most fundamental presuppositions of life, but it is and remains a 
will!… And […] man would rather will nothingness than not will’ (op. cit. 28). 
The desire to transcend life, ‘this longing to get away’, manifests itself in 
different ways. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the ascetic priest is the 
embodiment of the ascetic ideal. The priest represents ‘the incarnate desire to 
be different, to be in a different place’ (op. cit. 13). His greatest desire is to 
escape the earthly realm altogether, and he treats life as merely ‘a bridge’ that 
leads to ‘quite a different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes’ (op. 
cit. 11). He believes this alternative mode of existence to be far superior to 
earthly life, a realm where humanness, with all of its passions, pains and 
suffering, is transcended. 
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In science, the desire for transcendence takes the form of a dispassionate quest 
for unconditional truths, a quest that hankers after a world unlike the one that 
actually exists. Nietzsche does not believe that there is an otherworldly realm of 
any description, and therefore does not see that there is anywhere to transcend 
to. This is why he calls the ascetic ideal ‘a will to nothingness’ (I owe this point 
to Richard Schacht 2013: 339). The will to nothingness also points to the 
demand endemic to science for an ascetic attitude towards truth-seeking, 
namely, the suppression of emotions, passions and instincts, or as Nietzsche 
puts it, ‘the affects grown cool, the tempo of life slowed down, dialectic in place 
of instinct’ (GM III: 25). In Nietzsche’s view, to stamp out such affective states 
completely is to stamp out life itself.
Yet although the desire for transcendence is a desire for nothingness, it at least 
provides believers in the ascetic ideal with something to will for. Nietzsche sees 
the need to will something, the need for a goal, as a fundamental feature of ‘the 
human will’: ‘That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, 
is an expression of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui. It needs a 
goal—and it will rather will nothingness than not will’ (op. cit. 1). So it would be a 
mistake to think that the ascetic ideal is just the ‘“life against life”’ affectation (op. 
cit. 13). In providing a focus for willing, the ascetic ideal is a means of 
preserving life, and this is the reason for its endurance: ‘the ascetic ideal 
springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries by all 
means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence’ (ibid.). It is the conceptual 
component of the ascetic ideal that serves this life-preserving function. By 
ascribing meaning to the psychological sickness of world-weariness and self-
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disgust, the ascetic ideal is a palliative to this sickness. Nietzsche sees that 
meaningless suffering is worse than suffering per se: 
‘Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning […] 
His existence on earth contained no goal; “why man at all?”—was a 
question without an answer […] The meaninglessness of suffering, not 
suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far—and the ascetic 
ideal offered man meaning!’ (op. cit. 28). 
In brief, the Judaeo-Christian tradition alleviates suffering by giving it a new 
meaning of just punishment for sin. Thus ‘the invalid has been transformed into 
“the sinner”’, and his suffering is reinterpreted as ‘feelings of guilt, fear, and 
punishment’ (op. cit. 20). This reinterpretation is effective in relieving man’s 
depression and world-weariness by producing ‘orgies’ of other feelings 
associated with guilt and punishment, and by awakening his interest in life with 
mysterious religious notions including ‘the secrets of the torture chamber, the 
inventiveness of hell’ (ibid.). The highest metaphysical value animating this 
religious tradition is of course God, a being whom Nietzsche says is 
synonymous with truth: ‘the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God is 
truth, that truth is divine’ (op. cit. 24). 
Science alleviates suffering in a different way. This is a domain where ‘so much 
that is useful remains to be done’ in terms of research and discovery (op. cit. 
23). This provides scholars with a very good reason to engage themselves in 
endless academic endeavours, and in their industriousness, forget their 
suffering. In burying themselves in their work, scholars do not have to confront 
their own ‘discontent, disbelief, gnawing worm, despectio sui, bad 
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conscience’ (ibid.). Hence Nietzsche says that science is a ‘means of self-
narcosis’ (ibid.). Science has shrugged off religion’s ‘dogmatic concepts […] 
(“God,” “soul,” “freedom,” “immortality”)’ in the name of the ostensibly objective 
study of real life (op. cit. 25). Yet the highest metaphysical value animating 
scientific endeavour is God by another name—truth. As Nietzsche puts it: 
‘science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation […] on the 
same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth is 
inestimable and cannot be criticised). Therefore they are necessarily 
allies’ (ibid.). In this way, science is simply the most recent development of the 
ascetic ideal, and indeed its strongest manifestation. I expand on the 
connection between science and religion with reference to the will to truth in the 
third chapter.
The four aspects of the will to truth that I have outlined provide the basis for a 
thorough understanding of why Nietzsche questions the will to truth. This is the 
subject of the next chapter. The important point to note for now is that the will to 
truth itself, or rather, the inconsistencies at its heart, gives rise to such 
questioning. Thus Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil ‘what questions 
has this will to truth not laid before us! What strange, wicked, questionable 
questions!’ (BGE: 1). The questions are why we value truth, and if we do, why 
we should value truth: ‘What in us really wants “truth”?’, and, ‘Suppose we want 
truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?’ (ibid.). The 
questions are strange and wicked because posing them—calling the will to truth 
into question—goes against a philosophical tradition that takes for granted that 
truth is unconditionally valuable.
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Part I: Nietzsche’s Critique of the Unconditional Value of Truth 
Chapter 2. Why Nietzsche critiques the unconditional will to truth
Part of the reason that Nietzsche critiques the unconditional will to truth is 
because he believes that it constrains life more than it enhances it. In other 
words, he sees the effects of the unconditional will to truth as more life-denying 
than life-affirming. In short, the unconditional will to truth leads to two life-
denying desires—for the world to be radically different from the way it is, and for 
us to be radically different from the way we are. Nietzsche summarises these 
desires in a note as follows: ‘1. How can one get free from the false, merely 
apparent world? […]; 2. how can one become oneself as much as possible the 
antithesis of the character of the apparent world?’ (WTP: 584). I address these 
points in turn, first by looking at how the unconditional will to truth denies the 
nature of the world, and then by looking at how it denies our nature—
specifically, our need for falsification to make life possible, and illusion to make 
life bearable. I then dispel the thought that Nietzsche values untruth more highly 
than truth, by showing how untruth can work against life, and how the value that 
truth and untruth have for life is more important than the value of truth and 
untruth per se.
How the unconditional will to truth denies the nature of the world 
Nietzsche identifies in the unconditional will to truth a belief in ‘a “true” world’, 
and at the heart of this belief, he sees a desire to ‘get free from the false, merely 
apparent world’ (ibid.). Here Nietzsche is referring to the distinction that 
philosophers have drawn between the ‘apparent’ world or the world of 
appearance—made up of all the things we perceive around us—and the ‘real’ or 
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‘true’ world—conceived as an order of immutable mind-independent objects or 
things-in-themselves. This ‘real’ or ‘true’ world has properties of permanence, 
uniformity and stability. As Nietzsche puts it, ‘the true world, to which one seeks 
the way, cannot contradict itself, cannot change, cannot become, has no 
beginning and no end’ (ibid.). This is the world where ‘truths’ are traditionally 
thought to be found, and to which they are traditionally thought to correspond. 
This is why Nietzsche says that ‘the will to truth is […] merely the desire for a 
world of the constant’ (op. cit. 585). The conviction that there is nothing more 
valuable than truth therefore equates to the conviction that there is nothing 
more valuable than constancy.
However, Nietzsche believes that the idea of an eternal and immutable world 
order—a ‘world of the unconditional and self-identical’—is pure invention (BGE: 
4). For Nietzsche, there is no world apart from the so-called apparent world, and 
indeed the very distinction between real or true, and apparent or false, is 
redundant. As he puts it: ‘The “apparent" world is the only one: the “real” world 
has only been lyingly added’ (TI III: 2); and ‘[t]he “true world” and the “apparent 
world”—that means: the mendaciously invented world and reality’ (EH Preface: 
2). Moreover, as Nietzsche sees it, the world is an ever-changing, chaotic, 
ambiguous mass of units of power. It has properties of ‘change, becoming, 
multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war’ (WTP: 584). The notion of a ‘real’ or 
‘true’ world as a timeless, stable and immutable realm is a gross misconception. 
Yet this is the conception of the world that Nietzsche sees scholars affirming 
through their faith in the unconditional value of truth. Even those who have 
renounced the notion of correspondence truths, or things-in-themselves, affirm 
the notion of a true world if they uphold truth as an unconditional value. This is 
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because, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the unconditional value of truth is but another 
manifestation of belief in a true world:
‘The truthful man, in the audacious and ultimate sense presupposed by the 
faith in science, thereby affirms another world than that of life, nature, and 
history; and insofar as he affirms this “other world,” does this not mean that 
he has to deny its antithesis, this world, our world?’ (GM III: 24). 
In this way, scholars who ascribe unconditional value to truth still perpetuate the 
notion of a world that does not exist, one that opposes the nature of the material 
world in which everything is interconnected and interdependent. Hence scholars 
are affirming nothingness, and their unconditional valuation of truth is a form of 
nihilism (I owe this point to May 1999: 155-156). Another important aspect of the 
scholar’s affirmation of another world has to do with the will to truth’s moral 
justification, which is something I address in the next chapter.
The scholar’s affirmation of the ‘true’ world goes hand in hand with his 
withdrawal from the material world. There are two aspects to the scholar’s 
withdrawal: passivity, that is, spectating on life but not participating in it, and the 
repression of emotions and personal interests. Nietzsche does not see the 
scholar’s quest for ‘true’ knowledge through scientific or objective research as a 
form of active engagement with the world, but a form of passive reflection on it. 
Hence he describes the scholar, or ‘objective person’, as a mere ‘instrument for 
measuring’ or ‘an arrangement of mirrors’ (BGE: 207). This type of person has 
no personality or individuality, none of his own ‘substance and content’, but 
doggedly applies himself to his research tasks, to ‘whatever wants to be known, 
without any other pleasure than that found in knowing and “mirroring”’ (ibid.). 
The scholar has divorced himself from his personal feelings, desires and 
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interests. Hence his life is characterised by ‘the affects grown cool, the tempo of 
life slowed down, dialectic in place of instinct, seriousness imprinted on faces 
and gestures (seriousness, the most unmistakable sign of […] struggling, 
laborious life’ (GM III: 25). The scholar’s repression of his feelings is partly due 
to the mistaken belief that this will aid his objectivity, but also to his need to 
forget his suffering. In this way, science is ‘a means of self-narcosis’ (op. cit. 
23). All in all, scholarly pursuits involve ‘a certain impoverishment of life’ (op. cit. 
25), even ‘a concealed will to death’ (GS: 344). 
Nietzsche sees the dispassionate mode of inquiry that science promotes as 
ineffectual and counterproductive. Not only is it a passive, rather than an active, 
way of engaging with the world, but it is extremely limited in terms of what it 
allows us to understand of the world. Hence Nietzsche writes that ‘an 
interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, 
and nothing more’, otherwise known as “‘a scientific” interpretation of the world’, 
could well be ‘one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, 
meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning’ (op. cit. 373). The 
reason Nietzsche says this is because he believes that the only way we 
experience or grasp anything is by means of ‘affective interpretations’ that are 
always from a particular interested or partial perspective. There is no way of 
eliminating particularity from an interpretation. As Nietzsche notes: ‘The 
perspective […] decides the character of the “appearance”! As if a world would 
still remain over after one deducted the perspective!’ (WTP: 567). As each 
perspectival interpretation captures only a tiny fraction of what is otherwise 
infinitesimally complex, the closest we can get to objectivity is to entertain the 
greatest number of interpretations as possible in order to obtain as rounded a 
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picture as possible: ‘There is only a perspectiv[al] seeing, only a perspectiv[al] 
"knowing"; and the more affects [subjective feelings] we allow to speak about 
one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the 
more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our “objectivity,” be' (GM: III: 12). 
Even if it were possible to suspend our feelings, this would incapacitate the 
intellect and thwart any understanding: to ‘suspend each and every affect, 
supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the 
intellect?’ (ibid.).
The unconditional will to truth devalues our world in favour of an impossible 
conception of it as a ‘“world of truth”’, where it is stripped of its ‘rich 
ambiguity’ (GS: 373). The reverence for the world of truth is the ‘reverence for 
everything that lies beyond your horizon’ (ibid.). Yet Nietzsche sees nothing 
beyond this horizon, and therefore regards any attempt to go beyond it as futile. 
The only arena in which truth-seeking takes place and truths are created (more 
of this in chapter four) is this world, the so-called apparent world: ‘if, with the 
virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of some philosophers, one wanted to 
abolish the “apparent world” altogether—well, supposing you could do that, at 
least nothing would be left of your “truth” either’ (BGE: 34). It makes more sense 
to appreciate the world we have, for all its constant change and ambiguity. 
Nietzsche thinks the Greeks had the right idea about life—they embraced the 
world of appearance, realising that there is nothing to be gained from reaching 
beyond it: ‘Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is 
to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to 
believe in forms, tones, worlds, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those 
Greeks were superficial—out of profundity’ (GS Preface: 4). 
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The unconditional will to truth also devalues our mode of cognition, for we tend 
to believe that ‘our square little reason’ is the necessary means of accessing or 
mastering the world of truth (GS: 373). The application of reason involves the 
attempt to adopt a perspective-free viewpoint, specifically, the ‘renunciation of 
all interpretation (of forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, 
falsifying, and whatever else is of the essence of interpreting)’ (GM III: 24). This 
is absurd, because, as Nietzsche sees it, there is no cognition without 
perspectival interpretation, and there is no possibility of obtaining a perspective-
free view of the world: ‘That mountain there! That cloud there! What is “real” in 
that? Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober 
friends! If you can! […] There is no “reality” for us—not for you either’ (GS: 57). 
As interpretations are the only means we have of representing the world, they 
are the only means by which life takes place: ‘there would be no life at all if not 
on the basis of perspectival estimates and appearances’ (BGE: 34).
How the unconditional will to truth denies our need for falsification
For Nietzsche, falsification is an integral part of human cognition. It occurs as a 
result of the transformation of raw sense data into conscious mental content. As 
I explained above, Nietzsche believes that we experience the world by means 
of perspectival interpretations or, to use Lanier Anderson’s term, ‘cognitive 
representations’ (Anderson 2005: 188). These representations arise from the 
confluence of the raw sense data with our concepts of logic and reason. In its 
original form, the original sense data or ‘material of the senses’ is chaotic and 
obscure, mirroring the way the world is. It is only the imposition of our concepts 
of logic and reason that transforms the material into something 
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‘“recognisable”’ (WTP: 569). Nietzsche summarises this process as: ‘the 
fuzziness and chaos of the sense impressions are, as it were, logicised’ (ibid.). 
Consequently, all cognitive representations are falsifications in the sense that 
they are distortions of the original sense material. In other words, the 
falsification is of the sense material, rather than of a ‘true’ world of independent 
things-in-themselves. This means there is only one world, the world of the 
senses, but formless and formed versions of it: ‘the antithesis of this 
phenomenal world is not “the true world,” but the formless unformulable world of 
the chaos of sensations—another kind of phenomenal world, a kind 
“unknowable” for us’ (ibid.). The idea of our experiences being founded on an 
unknowable world of sensations could be seen as bringing back the distinction 
between appearance and reality that Nietzsche says he rejects. However, I 
think Nietzsche would resist this charge because, in his view, the senses ‘show 
[us] becoming, passing away, change’, indicating that we do experience these 
things (TI III: 2). Perhaps he describes the chaos of sensations as “unknowable” 
to indicate a lack of correspondence between the chaos of sensations and our 
epistemological categories of reason. As Christoph Cox expresses this idea: ‘we 
might say that the world outside of our rational interpretation is […] “unknowable 
for us” in the sense that it does not conform to the rational structure of our 
ordinary experience’ (Cox 1999: 146). 
This rational structure is a function of consciousness. Consciousness serves a 
social purpose, namely, the need to communicate with others. Hence Nietzsche 
says that ‘[c]onsciousness is really only a net of communication between human 
beings’ (GS: 354). Consciousness evolved to enable us to communicate our 
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need for help and protection to others. In other words, it was useful to our 
survival. Successful communication requires us to use the same language, or 
signs, in order to be understood, such ‘that consciousness does not really 
belong to man’s individual existence but rather to his social or herd 
nature’ (ibid.). In this way, when we become conscious of sense material, we 
‘fix’ it using ‘signs’ in order to render it communicable, and in so doing, translate 
it ‘into the perspective of the herd’, rendering it a distorted version of the original 
(ibid.). This explains Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘becoming conscious’ as ‘a 
great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and 
generalisation’ (ibid.).
What renders the sense material recognisable and communicable is our ‘logic 
and […] categories of reason’ (WTP: 584). These allow us to ‘reduce the 
confusing multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema’ (ibid.). By logic 
and categories of reason, Nietzsche has in mind such notions as equality, 
substances, movement, and cause and effect. Yet even though these concepts 
are inventions, falsifications, they are essential for life: 
‘We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live—by positing 
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and 
content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But 
that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might 
include error’ (GS: 121). 
For example, early people who were able to quickly perceive different predatory 
creatures and edible materials as being alike were more likely to survive, 
despite the fact that ‘nothing is really equal’ (op. cit. 111). Substances do not 
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refer to anything real, but merely obscure the fact that everything is constantly 
changing: ‘the beings that did not see [the changes in things] so precisely had 
an advantage over those that saw everything “in flux”’ (ibid.). The concept of 
cause and effect simplifies ‘an infinite number of processes’ occurring 
simultaneously, which presumably would be overwhelming and unfathomable 
(op. cit. 112). We isolate cause and effect from this multitude of processes, but 
‘such a duality probably never exists; in truth we are confronted by a continuum 
out of which we isolate a couple of pieces […] The suddenness with which 
many effects stand out misleads us; actually, it is sudden only for us’ (ibid.). Our 
mistake, says Nietzsche, is to mischaracterise these logical notions as tools for 
establishing what is true and real, rather than tools for ‘making the world 
manageable and calculable’ (WTP: 584). In other words, we believe our logical 
notions to be criteria for discovering ‘truth and reality’, when they are really ‘a 
system of systematic falsification’ (ibid.).
The unconditional will to truth advocates renouncing all such falsifications 
precisely because they are not true. Yet such renunciation would be suicidal 
because it is only by means of these falsifications that life is possible:
‘the falsest judgments […] are the most indispensable for us […] without 
accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely 
invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant 
falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live […] 
renouncing false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life’ 
(BGE: 4).
The process of representation or interpretation enables us to carve a world for 
ourselves out of obscure, tumultuous and ambiguous sense data. The 
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imposition of order and form on the overwhelming disorder and chaos of the 
original sense material is necessary because it makes the world regular, 
predictable and comprehensible, and therefore habitable. The world that 
emerges is of our own creation, and it is the only world there is:
‘In all perception, i.e., in the most original appropriation, what is essentially 
happening is […] an imposition of shapes upon things […] Thus arises our 
world, our whole world: and no supposed “true reality”, no “in-themselves of 
things” corresponds to this whole world which we have created, belonging 
to us alone” (1885: Notebook 38 [10]). 
How the unconditional will to truth denies our need for illusions
Nietzsche believes that we need illusion to make life bearable, as a counter to 
the suffering that existence inevitably entails. This suffering is especially 
problematic because there does not appear to be any reason for it. Nietzsche 
diagnoses the meaninglessness of suffering as the modern-day scourge:
‘man was surrounded by a fearful void—he did not know how to justify, to 
account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the problem of meaning. He 
also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal: but his problem 
was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, 
“why do I suffer?” Man, the bravest of animals and the one most 
accustomed to suffering, does not repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, 
he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of 
suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the 
curse that lay over mankind so far’ (GM III: 28).
This lack of meaning, for suffering as well as for existence, is one of the 
reasons that the ascetic ideal became so entrenched, an idea I return to in the 
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next chapter. It is a certain type of person that experiences this problem of a 
lack of meaning—‘nobly formed natures’, who ‘feel profoundly the weight and 
burden of existence, and must be deluded by exquisite stimulants into 
forgetfulness of their displeasure’ (BT: 18). These exquisite stimulants can take 
various forms, and Nietzsche highlights three in particular. First is the ‘Socratic 
love of knowledge’, which promotes the ‘delusion’ that knowledge can ‘heal the 
eternal wound of existence’ and provides a purpose in the quest for truth (ibid.). 
Second is ‘art’s seductive veil of beauty’, which distracts us with its ‘great and 
sublime forms’ (ibid. and op. cit. 21). Third is ‘the metaphysical comfort’ to be 
found in the notion of ‘eternal life’ provided by tragic myths (op. cit. 18). These 
three manifestations of illusion give the noble types a reason to keep living: ‘the 
insatiable will always finds a way to detain its creatures in life and compel them 
to live on, by means of an illusion spread over things’ (ibid.). Here I am going to 
concentrate on artistic illusion, because this is Nietzsche’s focus in his later 
works such as The Gay Science, and because the apparent tension between 
art and the intellectual conscience provides important insights into Nietzsche’s 
view of the value of truth. This is something I address in chapter six.
Nietzsche says that art makes life tolerable: ‘[a]rt [is] the good will to 
appearance […] As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for 
us’ (GS: 107). Art makes life tolerable because it beautifies what is ugly or 
repellant about life, specifically, truth: ‘Truth is ugly. We possess art lest we 
perish of the truth’ (WTP: 822). Truth is ugly because it encompasses 
everything we find unpalatable, painful and deplorable about life and human 
nature, and I say more about this in chapter four. Essentially, artists teach us 
how to disguise this ugliness—how to ‘make things beautiful, attractive, and 
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desirable for us when they are not’—which allows us to experience them as 
valuable (GS: 299). Artists also teach us how to apply this skill outside the 
artistic domain, to ourselves, enabling us to be ‘the poets of our life’ (ibid.). This 
means we are able to emphasise certain aspects of ourselves and underplay 
others to obtain an overall favourable impression or positive valuation of 
ourselves: 
‘Only artists […] have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed in 
everyday characters; only they have taught us the art of viewing ourselves 
as heroes—from a distance and, as it were, simplified and transfigured—
the art of staging and watching ourselves. Only in this way can we deal with 
some base details in ourselves’ (op. cit. 78).
Nietzsche characterises artistic practice in terms of deception and untruth. For 
example, Nietzsche says that art is ‘this kind of cult of the untrue’ (op. cit. 107), 
where ‘the lie is sanctified and the will to deception has a good conscience’ (GM 
III: 25). He describes an artist as: ‘Falseness with a good conscience; the 
delight in simulation […] the inner craving for a role and mask, for 
appearance’ (GS: 361). The unconditional will to truth requires that we reject 
lies and deception purely on the grounds that they are not true. For example, 
Nietzsche says that religion, which promotes truthfulness as its highest moral 
standard, ‘relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute 
standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and 
damns art’ (BT Attempt at Self-Criticism: 5). Yet art is valuable because it 
provides new perspectives on both ourselves and life in general, allowing us to 
see both in a new appreciative light (I owe this point to Janaway 2014: 55). 
Nietzsche expresses the point thus: ‘Without this art we would be nothing but 
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foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective which makes what is 
closest at hand and most vulgar appear as it if were vast, and reality itself’ (GS: 
78). In short, art allows us to affirm life.
How deception can be as life-denying as the unconditional will to truth
Contrary to what Nietzsche says are our ‘accustomed value feelings’—
presumably those that accord ultimate value to truth—untruth proves to be just 
as useful as truth. Hence Nietzsche writes that ‘untruth [is] a condition of 
life’ (BGE: 4). I have shown two ways in which untruth can be considered a 
condition of life. Untruths in the sense of falsifications are necessary for us to 
make sense of the overwhelming chaos of sense material and create a 
habitable world for ourselves, and untruths in the sense of artistic illusions are 
necessary to make life bearable. In this way, untruths are valuable because 
they have practical utility for life. Thus Nietzsche uncouples the truth of a 
interpretation from its value. In other words, we should value an interpretation 
for how beneficial it is to life, rather than for how accurately it represents the 
world. As Nietzsche puts it: ‘The falseness of a judgment is for us not 
necessarily an objection to a judgment […] The question is to what extent it is 
life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-
cultivating’ (ibid.).
Nietzsche repudiates the unconditional will to truth insofar as it recommends the 
rejection of ‘semblance, meaning error, deception, simulation, delusion, self-
delusion’ (GS: 344). Such rejection is hostile to life, the stuff of which is 
‘semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives 
and error’ (BT Attempt at Self-Criticism: 5). However, this does not mean either 
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that Nietzsche rejects the will to truth wholesale, or that he venerates in place of 
the will to truth the ‘will to deception’ (BGE: 2) or the ‘will to appearance’ (GS: 
107). The will to truth does have positive connotations in Nietzsche’s work, 
particularly in conjunction with the notion of intellectual conscience, on which I 
elaborate in chapter four. In brief, the will to truth can be manifested in healthy 
or unhealthy ways, with Christians and scholars manifesting it in an unhealthy 
way (I owe this point to Gemes 2006). Similarly, deception can work against life. 
It can work against life precisely when the deception is ‘unconditional and 
otherworldly’, rather than ‘conditional and this-worldly’, as Cox points out (Cox 
1999: 42).
Christianity is a form of deception that manifests both unconditionality and 
otherworldliness. Nietzsche objects to Christianity’s pretensions to ultimacy, to 
be the supreme power. Hence Nietzsche notes: ‘one always pays dearly and 
terribly when religions […] insist on having their own sovereign way, when they 
themselves want to be ultimate ends and not means among other means’ (BGE: 
62). The people that pay are the ‘higher’ or stronger types, for whom religious 
dogma is particularly constrictive and potentially destructive. Moreover, the 
absolutism of religious teachings places them beyond question or critical 
scrutiny. Beliefs held uncritically, on the basis of faith alone, are contrary to an 
intellectual conscience: 
‘One sort of honesty has been alien to all founders of religion and their kind: 
They have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for 
knowledge. “What did I really experience? What happened in me and 
around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will 
opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?” 
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None of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear religious 
people ask them even now. On the contrary, they thirst after things that go 
against reason, and they do not wish to make it too hard for themselves to 
satisfy it’ (GS: 319).
Nietzsche also objects to the way in which Christianity’s sanctification of an 
otherworldly eternal realm, heaven, and an otherworldly being, God, leads its 
adherents to recoil from this life in the unfounded belief that their ‘real’ lives in 
the otherworldly realm are still to come, whereupon the suffering occasioned by 
their existence on earth will be over: 
‘Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life’s 
nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed 
up as, faith in “another” or “better” life. Hatred of “the world,” 
condemnations of the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond 
invited the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving of the nothing, for 
the end, for respite’ (BT Attempt at Self-Criticism: 5).
Nietzsche views interpretations that are conditional and contingent more 
favourably because they share the same characteristics as the world and, as 
such, affirm the world. As Cox puts the point, ‘only those interpretations that 
affirm this conditionality, contingency, and relativity will affirm life’ (Cox 1999: 
43). The usefulness or life-enhancing nature of such interpretations varies by 
person and by time. What enhances the life of a ‘higher’ or stronger type of 
person does the very opposite for a weaker type: ‘What serves the higher type 
of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison for a very different 
and inferior type’ (BGE: 30). Even for the same person, what is life-enhancing 
will change over time: ‘At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire 
strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their “convictions.” Later—we see 
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them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are’ (op. cit. 
231). 
How exactly is life enhanced? Here I follow May in elucidating three criteria that 
Nietzsche values for being life-enhancing—power, power sublimation and the 
creation of form (May 1999: 26). Power does not just take the form of strength 
or force, but also the feeling or sensation of power. Nietzsche believes that 
anything that heightens our feeling of power is life-enhancing: ‘What is good?—
All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. 
What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness’ (A: 2). However, power must 
be ‘sublimated’ or harnessed in the service of an overarching goal if it is not to 
be expressed in a destructive fashion (May 1999: 27). For example, Nietzsche 
lauds the highest or sovereign men for coordinating and unifying a large range 
of diverse and contrary drives in the service of an important purpose or task. 
The sovereign’s drives are highly organised and constructive, with a clear sense 
of direction. This is a sign of strength: ‘The multitude and disgregation of 
impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a weak 
“will”; their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a “strong 
will”’ (WTP: 46).
Crucially, the goal in the service of which power is harnessed—the creation of 
form—must commend life as opposed to denigrating it. Form-creation can occur 
in three ways. The first is the creation of valuations that commend life. For 
example, Nietzsche advocates that we ‘limit ourselves to the purification of our 
opinions and valuations and to the creation of our own new tables of what is 
good, and let us stop brooding about the “moral value of our actions”!’ (GS: 
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335). People who indulge in such brooding dwell on the past and ‘never live in 
the present’ (ibid.). The second is the creation of artworks that make life appear 
beautiful, and the third is the artistic shaping of our characters, which is a more 
personal version of the artistic beautification of life. I have elaborated on the 
value of these artistic forms of creation above, but reiterate here that their aim is 
to render both life and ourselves affirmable. For example, character-styling is a 
way for a person to reintegrate the weaker aspects of his character into a more 
pleasing picture that he is able to endorse and thereby ‘attain satisfaction with 
himself’ (op. cit. 290). As Nietzsche expresses the point:
‘To “give style” to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by 
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then 
fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and 
reason and even weaknesses delight the eye’ (ibid.). 
The criterion of form-creation is necessary because power and power 
sublimation alone do not guard against the possibility of them being expressed 
in life-denying ways. Nietzsche repudiates the unconditional will to truth as 
manifested in religion and science for precisely this reason.  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Part I: Nietzsche’s Critique of the Unconditional Value of Truth 
Chapter 3. How Nietzsche critiques the unconditional will to truth
I now examine Nietzsche’s method of critiquing the unconditional will to truth. In 
brief, Nietzsche critiques the unconditional will to truth by means of a 
genealogical analysis that charts its origination and evolution. I reconstruct this 
genealogical analysis, demonstrating along the way how it reveals two aspects 
of the unconditional will to truth that undermine its status as an ultimate value, 
meaning a value that trumps all other values. These two aspects are that the 
unconditional will to truth is: i) contrary to what Nietzsche calls the scientific 
spirit, because it takes the form of an unquestioned and unjustified 
presupposition; ii) self-negating, insofar as it leads to the repudiation of its own 
metaphysical justification. In this way, Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis 
devalues the unconditional will to truth by revealing its internal inconsistencies.
To understand how truth became an ultimate value, it is helpful to consider the 
first two stages of Nietzsche’s six-stage history of the development of the idea 
of the ‘true world’ in a passage entitled ‘How the “True World” Finally Became a 
Fiction’ in Twilight of the Idols (translation altered). The first stage in this history 
is the Platonic conception of the true world as a realm of eternal forms, to which 
certain people had access in the here and now, namely, ‘the wise, the pious, the 
virtuous’ (TI: IV). In this first stage, Nietzsche says that the notion of the true 
world is synonymous with the claim “I, Plato, am the truth.”’ (ibid.). The Platonic 
conception of the true world equates truth with eternal, immutable and original 
forms that are conceived as being metaphysically prior to their imperfect 
counterparts in the material world. In other words, ‘the “true” world is not one 
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which changes and becomes, but one which is’ (Notebook 1887: 9[38]). It is this 
putative true world of original forms that is considered more valuable and 
desirable than the material world, partly because of a strong desire for stability 
and order: ‘the “true” world is supposed to be the good world—why? 
appearance, change, contradiction, struggle devalued as immoral; desire for a 
world in which these things are missing’ (WTP: 578).
In the second stage of the development of the idea of a ‘true world’, the true 
world of Platonic forms ‘becomes Christian’ (TI: IV). The true world is now the 
kingdom of God, no longer accessible in the here and now, and only ‘promised 
to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man (“to the sinner who repents”)’ (ibid.). 
Since for Nietzsche, Christianity is just a popularised form of Platonism 
(‘Christianity is Platonism for “the people”’ (BGE: Preface)), presumably at the 
second stage, God, rather than Plato, is the truth, making the two notions 
interchangeable. As Nietzsche puts it elsewhere, ‘God is truth, […] truth is 
divine’ (GM III: 24). With the institutionalisation of Christianity, this equation of 
God with truth takes the form of a moral commandment against false testimony, 
or, in other words, a moral imperative to always tell the truth whatever the 
consequences. Eventually, this morality leads to the development of what 
Nietzsche refers to as ‘the European conscience’, ‘scientific conscience’, 
‘intellectual cleanliness at any price’ (GS: 357), or ‘intellectual conscience’ (op. 
cit. 335). The intellectual conscience is a more refined or rigorous version of the 
moral imperative to always tell the truth. It is an unremitting truthfulness that 
involves rejecting any belief or statement that cannot be proven to be true. It is 
only a matter of time before the intellectual conscience takes into its purview 
Christian doctrine itself, whereupon belief in God becomes a ‘lie’ and belief in 
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the idea that nature and history attest to God’s existence becomes ‘indecent 
and dishonest’ (op. cit. 357). In short, all ‘Christian interpretations’ become 
considered counterfeit (WTP: 1). In this way, Christian morality contains the 
seeds of its own destruction. Hence Nietzsche writes: ‘You see what it was that 
really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of 
truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, the father confessor's 
refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into a 
scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price’ (GS: 357). 
Nietzsche expresses the same point more emotively in his notes: ‘The end of 
Christianity—at the hands of its own morality […] which turns against the 
Christian God (the sense of truthfulness, developed highly by Christianity, is 
nauseated by the falseness and mendaciousness of all Christian interpretations 
of the world and of history […])’ (WTP: 1).
Generally speaking, Nietzsche sees the rise of what he terms scientific atheism 
as a positive development in European history: ‘the decline of the faith in the 
Christian god, the triumph of scientific atheism, is a generally European event in 
which all races had their share and for which all deserve credit and 
honour’ (GS: 357). Nietzsche welcomes two aspects of science. Firstly, he 
approves of its remit of tangible earthly phenomena, and its naturalistic 
explanations of these phenomena, as opposed to Christianity’s fixation on an 
otherworldly realm, and its metaphysical explanations of earthly phenomena. 
Nietzsche sums up the contrast as: ‘Christianity, which is at no point in contact 
with actuality […] must naturally be a mortal enemy of the “wisdom of the 
world”, that is to say of science’ (A: 47). Secondly, Nietzsche endorses what he 
calls scientific spirit, to be understood in broad terms as intellectual discipline, 
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‘clarity and severity in matters of intellectual conscience’ or ‘freedom of 
intellect’ (ibid.). The scientific spirit involves an instinctual and ruthless critical 
attitude towards all beliefs, it is ‘the instinctive distrust of the devious courses of 
thinking which, in consequence of long training, has taken root in the soul of 
every scientific man’ (HAH I: 635). Such devious thinking quickly turns an 
opinion into a fanatical conviction. Hence it is scientific method, rather than the 
results of science, that characterises the scientific spirit, and that guards against 
the rise of blind faith and superstition: ‘the scientific spirit is based upon a 
knowledge of method, and if the methods were lost, all the results of science 
could not prevent the renewed prevalence of superstition and absurdity’ (ibid.). 
Nietzsche’s appreciation of scientific method extends so far that he advocates 
that everyone ‘become thoroughly acquainted with at least one science’ in order 
to appreciate ‘how necessary is the extremest carefulness’ in belief-formation 
(ibid.). I elaborate on the characteristics of scientific spirit or method in the next 
chapter.
The key point here is that scientific method treats all convictions with critical 
suspicion, entertaining them only as hypotheses for experimental testing:
‘In science convictions have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good 
reason. Only when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses, 
of a provisional experimental point of view, of a regulative fiction, they may 
be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge—
though always with the restriction that they remain under police 
supervision, under the police of mistrust’ (GS: 344). 
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Yet despite this, there is one conviction that science upholds, having taken 
entirely on trust, namely, faith in truth as the ultimate value. In this sense, 
science, or rather scientists, are still ‘unconditional about one thing […] their 
faith in truth’ (GM III: 24). This is the unconditional will to truth, the ‘unconditional 
faith or conviction […] that truth is more important than every other thing, 
including every other conviction’ (GS: 344). This conviction is ‘so commanding 
and unconditional that it sacrifices all other conditions to itself’, crystallising in 
the idea that ‘“Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything 
else has only second-rate value’ (ibid.). Therefore although science has 
repudiated religious ‘dogmatic concepts’ such as ‘“God,” “soul,” “freedom,” 
“immortality”’, with its faith in the sanctity of truth, science’s ultimate value is the 
same as Christianity’s (GM III: 25). Hence Nietzsche describes scientists as 
‘godless […] anti-metaphysicians’ who are motivated by ‘a faith millennia old, 
the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God is truth, that truth is 
divine’ (op. cit. 24). Scientific practice involves treating all convictions with 
critical suspicion, yet, as an unquestioned and unjustified assumption, the 
conviction that truth has ultimate value is contrary to this practice.
Nietzsche identifies the unconditional will to truth as science’s driving value, it is 
the ‘prior conviction’ that ‘make[s] it possible for this discipline to begin’ (GS: 
344). Science needs a driving value because it is a mode of interpretation or 
description that does not itself create values: ‘Science […] first requires in every 
respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it could 
believe in itself—it never creates values’ (GM III: 25). While there is no science 
‘“without presuppositions”’, the presupposition that truth is unconditionally 
valuable is not empirical or even pragmatic. It is not grounded by the fact that 
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truth is always of benefit to life, but by the Christian moral imperative not to 
deceive. As Nietzsche expresses it, the unconditional will to truth means: ‘there 
is no alternative—“I will not deceive, not even myself”; and with that we stand 
on moral ground’ (GS: 344). The moral ground of the unconditional will to truth 
is therefore at odds with science’s focus on earthly phenomena and its 
naturalistic or this-worldly interpretations of such phenomena. In other words, 
the grounding for science’s driving value does not derive from the same non-
moral domain of ‘life, nature, and history’ as science. Hence Nietzsche asks: 
‘Why have morality at all when life, nature, and history are “not moral”?’ (ibid.). 
In brief, the Christian moral imperative against deception still animates science 
in the form of its unconditional valuation of truth. In this way, science affirms an 
otherworldly metaphysical world, and in so doing slanders the material world: 
‘those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is 
presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the 
world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this “other 
world”—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this 
world, our world?’ (ibid.). 
The original Christian moral grounds for the unconditional will to truth are 
inconsistent with the predominant acceptance of the idea that ‘“God is dead,” 
that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable”’ (op. cit. 343). As I 
explain above, this event occurred as the moral commandment against 
deception evolved into the ‘scientific conscience’, an insistence on ‘intellectual 
cleanliness at any price’ (op. cit. 357). The scientific conscience has subjected 
the notion of God to critical scrutiny and rejected it as dishonest. Yet since it 
was the notion of God that sanctioned the idea of truth as ultimately valuable, 
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that granted truth divine status, the same process of critical scrutiny should now 
apply to the unconditional will to truth. As Nietzsche puts it: ‘From the moment 
faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, a new problem arises: that of the 
value of truth’ (GM III: 24). The upshot is that, as a consequence of its evolution 
into the scientific conscience, the unconditional will to truth must now undergo 
experimental questioning to determine what value it has for life: ‘the value of 
truth must for once be experimentally called into question’ (ibid.).
In this way, the unconditional will to truth is self-negating. Its indictment against 
deception means that it has repudiated its own original metaphysical grounding. 
This leaves the will to truth with no justificatory backbone. As James Mangiafico 
neatly summarises this point: ‘Wanting only what is true and having realised that 
its own metaphysical foundation is untrue, the will to truth is now forced to draw 
one final inference: it must exclude itself from the domain of that which it 
accepts’ (Mangiafico 1997: 177). In this way, the unconditional will to truth 
brings about its own downfall, or to use Nietzsche’s terminology, it overcomes 
itself. This process of ‘self-overcoming’ is characteristic of ultimate values like 
‘Christian truthfulness’, a process that Nietzsche summarises as follows:
‘All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-
overcoming […] In this way Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its 
own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish, 
too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has 
drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking 
inference, its inference against itself; this will happen, however, when it 
poses the question “what is the meaning of all will to truth?” (GM III: 27). 
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It is important to note that as long as science continues to uphold truth as 
unconditionally valuable, it continues to manifest the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche 
points out that, although it is generally assumed that science has refuted the 
ascetic ideal, insofar as it has exposed religious interpretations as dishonest, it 
is actually the latest development of the ascetic ideal, and moreover the 
strongest form of it: 
‘[Science’s] relation to the ascetic ideal is by no means essentially 
antagonistic; it might even be said to represent the driving force in the 
latter’s inner development. […] This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both 
rest on the same foundation […] on the same overestimation of truth (more 
exactly: on the same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be 
criticised). Therefore they are necessarily allies […] this “modern 
science” […] is the best ally the ascetic ideal has at present, and precisely 
because it is the most unconscious, involuntary, hidden, and subterranean 
ally! […] The ascetic ideal has decidedly not been conquered: if anything, it 
became stronger, which is to say, more elusive, more spiritual, more 
captious, as science remorselessly detached and broke off wall upon wall, 
external additions that had coarsened its appearance’ (op. cit. 25).
There are two ways in which science manifests the ascetic ideal. These 
correspond to the two components of the ascetic ideal that I outlined in chapter 
one—an affective component that takes the form of an aversion towards earthly 
life, and a conceptual component that provides a meaning for existence and the 
suffering it entails. Nietzsche sums up the affective component as: 
‘this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of 
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, […] this longing to 
get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from 
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longing itself—all this means […] an aversion to life; a rebellion against the 
most fundamental presuppositions of life’ (op. cit. 28). 
Science manifests an aversion to life in four main ways. Firstly, science’s 
abiding objective of finding unconditional truths denigrates reality—which 
Nietzsche sees as characterised as ‘change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, 
contradiction, war’ (WTP: 584)—by attempting to redefine it as stable, 
permanent and predictable, or relocate it in a realm that has these properties. 
Secondly, in upholding the idea that a dispassionate, perspective-free viewpoint 
is necessary to glean truths, science also denigrates human cognition, which 
Nietzsche believes only occurs by means of affective interpretations and 
perspectives. Thirdly, science’s reverence for truth above all else necessarily 
devalues man himself. This devaluation also occurs as a result of science re-
situating man firmly within an indifferent natural world order, where he has no 
more significance than any other animal. Hence man becomes replaceable ‘in 
the great chain of being’, and his ‘existence appears more arbitrary, beggarly, 
and dispensable in the visible order of things’ (GM III: 25). In this way, science 
causes man to lose his sense of ‘dignity and uniqueness’, and relocate ‘his 
former respect for himself’ in the feelings of ‘self-contempt’ that arise from his 
thoroughgoing naturalisation (ibid.). Fourthly, an aversion to life is manifest in 
scientific practice itself. Scholars tend to spectate on rather than participate in 
life, and repress their personal feelings, desires and interests such that their 
lives are greatly impoverished.
Nevertheless, the service of truth provides a much-needed meaning for 
existence and the suffering that it necessarily entails. Scholars’ wholehearted 
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commitment to the quest for truth infuses their lives with meaning and diverts 
their attention from their suffering, suffering that is compounded by the life-
aversive affective component of the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche caricatures such 
scholars in a passage titled ‘The Leech’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which 
describes a man lying by a swamp having his arm bitten by leeches. The man is 
‘conscientious in spirit’, ‘master and connoisseur of […] the leech’s brain’ (Z IV: 
4). His longstanding commitment to his research into the brain of the leech has 
led to a high degree of personal self-sacrifice, reducing his life to his 
investigative activities and his world to the ‘handsbreadth of ground’ on which 
he pursues them: 
‘the leech’s brain:—that is my world! […] How long have I been pursuing 
this one thing, the brain of the leech, that the slippery truth might here no 
longer slip away from me! […] for this I have thrown away everything else; 
for this everything has become the same for me; and close by my knowing 
lies my black unknowing’ (ibid.). 
Hence scholars sublimate their suffering—their ‘discontent, disbelief, gnawing 
worm, despectio sui, bad conscience’—in the never-ending treadmill of 
scholarly research in the service of the truth (GM III: 23). Moreover, scholars are 
in denial about this state of affairs, ‘refus[ing] to admit to themselves what they 
are, […] drugged and heedless men who fear only one thing: regaining 
consciousness’ (ibid.). What scholars ignore is that scientific interpretation is 
one of many different interpretations of the world, another ‘regulative fiction’, 
rather than a way of life (GS: 344).
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In summary, despite two key differences between Christianity and science, 
science is another form of the ascetic ideal. Whereas Christianity is fixated on 
an otherworldly realm, providing metaphysical explanations for earthly 
phenomena, science focuses on the earthly world, and provides naturalistic 
explanations for earthly phenomena. Whereas Christianity accepts beliefs on 
the grounds of blind faith and conviction, science approaches them with ruthless 
critical suspicion. Despite these differences, the ascetic ideal reigns supreme in 
science because it is preserved in the ‘overestimation of truth’ that is science’s 
driving value (GM III: 25). This overestimation of truth is a hangover of the moral 
commandment to tell the truth sanctioned by God. In other words, ‘the ascetic 
ideal has hitherto dominated all philosophy, because truth was posited as being, 
as God, as the highest court of appeal’ (op. cit. 24). 
However, now that ‘faith in God of the ascetic ideal is denied’, the will to truth is 
open to critique, it is finally ‘permitted to be a problem’ (ibid.). Questioning the 
will to truth, or more specifically, ‘pos[ing] the question “what is the meaning of 
all will to truth”’ is to necessarily undermine the will to truth’s divine, inestimable 
status, and place the final nail in the coffin for ‘Christianity as morality’ (op. cit. 
27). This will herald the final self-destruction of the ascetic ideal: ‘As the will to 
truth gains self-consciousness […] morality will gradually perish now: this is […] 
the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all 
spectacles’ (ibid.). The self-overcoming of ‘Christian truthfulness’ was always 
inevitable (ibid.), for it leads ineluctably to the realisation that ‘reverence for truth 
is already the consequence of an illusion’, that such reverence is warrantless in 
the absence of the metaphysical foundations that it has already cast off for 
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being untrue (WTP: 602). The disintegration of the final vestige of Christian 
truthfulness will spell the end of the life-denying ascetic ideal.
However, the ascetic ideal has provided a meaning for man’s ‘existence on 
earth’, indeed, it has been ‘the only meaning offered so far’, the only 
interpretation of suffering that filled a ‘tremendous void’ of meaning, and staved 
off ‘suicidal nihilism’ (GM III: 28). Consequently, on the complete demise of 
Christian morality, the problem of meaning will again become acutely salient 
and give rise to nihilism. Nietzsche defines nihilism in different ways throughout 
his writings. Here I understand it both in terms of its intimate connection with 
mean ing lessness , as ‘be l ie f i n abso lu te wor th lessness , i . e . , 
meaninglessness’ (WTP: 617), and in terms of the process that gives rise to this 
feeling of meaninglessness, namely, the self-destruction of ultimate values: 
‘What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves’ (op. 
cit. 2). The important point is that after the unconditional will to truth has 
devaluated itself, the resulting nihilism clears the way for the revaluation of the 
will to truth: ‘why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the 
values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because 
nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals
—because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value 
these “values" really had’ (op. cit. Preface: 4). Such revaluation involves the 
adoption of an evaluative standpoint that is necessarily non-nihilistic, a point 
that it is important to bear in mind when I take up the problem of meaning in 
chapter six. However, I first want to offer an interpretation of how Nietzsche 
revalues truth. 
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Part 2: Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Truth 
Chapter 4. How Nietzsche revalues truth
In this chapter, I show how Nietzsche revalues truth having called it into 
question. I argue that Nietzsche values truth principally as the driver of a mode 
of critical or experimental inquiry that enables us to surpass life-inimical 
interpretations and that prevents new interpretations from becoming dogmatic, 
or in Nietzsche’s words, ‘prevent[s] the renewed prevalence of superstition and 
absurdity’ (HAH I: 635). To put it another way, Nietzsche values the truthful 
attitude that animates critical inquiry over and above any particular result of this 
inquiry. The reason for this valuation is bound up with Nietzsche’s conception of 
truth as perspectival interpretation. I start by showing how Nietzsche's 
conception of truth relates to the perspectival interpretative activity that enables 
us to construct a view of the world in order to make life possible within it. I then 
show how Nietzsche’s valuation of truth as the driver of critical inquiry is evident 
in the positive value he ascribes to what he calls the intellectual conscience and 
scientific method. Finally, I show how the figure of the free spirit epitomises this 
valuation of truth.
Truth as perspectival interpretation
To recap, Nietzschean truth does not belong to a transcendent realm of eternal, 
stable and unchanging things-in-themselves. For Nietzsche, the idea of such 
realm is a chimera. Nietzsche interprets reality as ever-changing and turbulent, 
contradictory and ambiguous, complex and chaotic. This is because the world 
and everything in it is made up of dynamic quanta, units of power that are part 
of the will to power—‘a monster of energy […] iron magnitude of force’—that 
   of  49 121
Nietzsche sees as constituting the world and everything in it (WTP: 1067). The 
dynamic quanta are in a perpetual play for power, striving unceasingly to 
increase their power and prevent other quanta from depleting it. The result is a 
state of constant change, tension and discord, a constant shift in the balance of 
power between the multitude of quanta, a world in which ‘everything is bound to 
and conditioned by everything else’ (op. cit. 584). No unconditional facts or 
truths can be wrought from this state of affairs, only interpretations that are 
informed by particular perspectives or points of view. In Nietzsche’s words: 
‘facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish 
any fact “in itself”: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing’ (op. cit. 481). It is 
the conception of truth as an absolute standard or a statement of universal and 
enduring validity that Nietzsche denies and disvalues. This conception of truth is 
completely impossible on Nietzsche’s worldview, and also unintelligible, 
because of the way that we cannot glean or know anything without interpreting 
it: ‘The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fable 
and approximation on the basis of a meagre sum of observations; it is “in 
flux,” […] as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for—
there is no “truth”’ (op. cit. 616).
As Nietzsche sees it, our senses show us the world in all its chaotic 
changeability and ambiguity. Yet the interpretative process abstracts a coherent 
and comprehensible view of the world from this complex and confusing sensory 
experience, from the ‘motley whirl of the senses’ (BGE: 14). So it is not our 
senses that distort reality such that there is a ‘real’ world distinct from the one 
that is apparent to us in experience. Rather, it is the interpretative process that 
distorts the material of the senses in order to make it comprehensible and 
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meaningful. In other words, the interpretative process, or ‘the active and 
interpreting forces’ select from the evidence of the senses to transform pure 
‘seeing’ into ‘seeing something’ (GM III: 12). Therefore the interpreting forces 
falsify the evidence of the senses, rather than the senses falsifying the world. As 
Nietzsche expresses this idea:
‘the senses […] do not lie at all. It is what we make of their evidence that 
first introduces a lie into it, for example the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, 
of substance, of duration… “Reason” is the cause of our falsification of the 
evidence of the senses. In so far as the senses show becoming, passing 
away, change, they do not lie […] being is an empty fiction. The “apparent” 
world is the only one: the “real” world has only been lyingly added’ (TI III: 2).
Consequently, we characterise the world in the process of interpreting our 
sensory experience of it. Nietzsche says that the world ‘is in all eternity chaos’, 
that it lacks the ‘order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom’ that we attribute to it 
(GS: 109). These attributions are of our own invention. Nietzsche calls them 
‘aesthetic anthropomorphisms’ to reflect that they are necessarily human in 
character (ibid.). Yet they make the world in experience comprehensible, 
manageable and habitable, for ‘[w]e can comprehend only a world that we 
ourselves have made’ (WTP: 495). We would find it hard, if not impossible, to 
flourish if we experienced the world as constant change and chaos, with no 
enduring substances, things, concepts or natural laws to anchor us. However, 
this does not mean that such attributions originate in the world, as opposed to in 
our interpretations of the world:
‘One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, 
forms, purposes, laws (“a world of identical cases”) as if they enabled us to 
fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in 
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which our existence is made possible:—we thereby create a world which is 
calculable, simplified, comprehensive, etc., for us’ (op. cit. 521). 
In short, we are engaged in a continuous process of creating and recreating the 
character of the world through the process of interpreting our sensory 
experience of it. Since the only means we have of conceptualising our sensory 
experience is the interpreting forces, the interpretations that result are an 
indissoluble part of our conception of the way things are (I owe this point to 
Remhof 2015: 233). In this way, we create the world in the process of 
interpreting it:
‘In all perception, i.e., in the most original appropriation, what is essentially 
happening is […] an imposition of shapes upon things […] Thus arises our 
world, our whole world: and no supposed “true reality”, no “in-themselves of 
things” corresponds to this whole world which we have created, belonging 
to us alone” (1885: Notebook 38 [10]). 
It is because we cannot escape our interpretative system, because ‘[w]e cannot 
look around our own corner’, so to speak, that we can never know whether 
there is any intelligible ‘existence without interpretation’ (GS: 374). Certainly, for 
Nietzsche, the process of interpretation enables life to take place; our existence 
depends on it: ‘all existence is […] essentially actively engaged in 
interpretation’, and without interpretation, existence has no ‘“sense”’ (ibid.). 
When Nietzsche talks about us falsifying the evidence of our senses, I take him 
to be referring to the mismatch between the evidence of our senses and our 
categories of reason. I also take him to be referring to the idea that there is no 
position we can take outside the perspectives that inform our interpretations of 
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the sensory evidence, that there is no possibility of a perspective-free viewpoint 
(see chapter two for more on these points). Steven Hales and Rex Welshon 
also highlight that implicit in Nietzsche’s claim that our interpretations are false 
is his view that the idea of ‘extra-perspectival truth’ is ‘an absurdity and a 
nonsense’ (Hales and Welshon 2000: 34-35). However, this does not preclude 
Nietzsche upholding the possibility of some interpretations being true ‘in all 
human perspectives’ (op. cit. 34). One example of this is Nietzsche’s claim that 
objectivity as an impartial disinterested viewpoint is impossible—for ‘[t]here is 
only a perspectiv[al] seeing, only a perspectiv[al] “knowing”' (GM: III: 12)—which 
purports to be true for all humans, at least within the theoretical paradigm of 
perspectivism.
Nietzsche believes that perspectivally true statements result from the same 
interpretative process as any other statement. This is why he says that truth is 
created, rather than found, and that it is a process of determining (what is true), 
rather than of becoming aware of something that is true in a fixed and pre-given 
sense. What motivates this process of determining something to be true is the 
‘drive to truth’ or a ‘“belief” in truth’ (WTP: 552). In Nietzsche’s words:
‘Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable […] “Truth” is 
therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but 
something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or 
rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as a 
processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a becoming-conscious of 
something that is in itself firm and determined’ (ibid.). 
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Nietzsche’s conception of truth as perspectival interpretation divests truth of its 
traditional qualities of permanence, neutrality and absolute correspondence with 
reality. Nietzsche makes truth conditional, provisional and replaceable, only 
ever in ascendence until a rival truth becomes dominant. Nietzsche take this 
attitude towards his own views, as the following assertions make clear: 
‘For me they were steps, I have climbed up upon them—therefore I had to 
pass over them. But they thought I wanted to settle down on them’ (TI I: 
42); and
‘We take our accidental positions […] as hostels for a night, which a 
wanderer needs and accepts—we beware of settling down’ (WTP: 132). 
There will always be rival truths because a multitude of different perspectives, 
and the extreme complexity and ever-changing nature of the world, mean that 
there is an infinite number of equally valid interpretations of it. As Nietzsche puts 
this, there is ‘[n]o limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted’ (op. cit. 
600), and there could be ‘many other ways of creating an apparent world’ (op. 
cit. 569).
Nietzsche diagnoses that our belief in absolute, extra-perspectival truth comes 
from our psychological need for ‘certainty […] that something should be firm’, for 
‘a support, a prop […] backbone, something to fall back on’ (GS: 347), which 
turns into the belief that unconditional or fixed foundations in the form of eternal 
facts or absolute truths really exist (I owe this point to Cox 1999: 47-48). 
Nietzsche also recognises that we tend to identify as absolute truth whatever 
facilitates life: ‘Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our 
practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we 
live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for us’ (WTP: 568). Yet Nietzsche 
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sees that both true and untrue interpretations are capable of facilitating life, and 
as such, there is no intrinsic relation between the usefulness of an interpretation 
and truth: ‘a belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of the 
species, has nothing to do with truth’ (op. cit. 487).
Nietzsche identifies the distinction we draw between true and false, or truth and 
untruth, as an interpretation that we project into the world as another way of 
making sense of it. It is part of an organisational schema that facilitates life: ‘The 
fictitious world of subject, substance, “reason,” etc., is needed—: there is in us a 
power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish’ (op. cit. 517). In 
Nietzsche’s view, true and false are intrinsically related, because they are both 
species of interpretation. This explains why Nietzsche is insistent that untruth 
can be of just as much value as truth if it helps preserve or enhance life; in other 
words, ‘both truth and untruth constantly [prove] to be useful’ (GS: 344). Instead 
of opposites manifesting a difference in kind, Nietzsche sees them manifesting 
a difference of degree. As Nietzsche notes, ‘opposites […] do not exist in 
themselves and […] actually express only variations in degree that from a 
certain perspective appear to be opposites. There are no opposites: only from 
those of logic do we derive the concept of opposites—and falsely transfer it to 
things’ (WTP: 552). In the case of ‘“true” and “false”’, Nietzsche says there is no 
‘essential opposition’, but ‘degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and 
darker shadows and shades of appearance’ (BGE: 34). 
This suggests that, rather than two contrary values, true and false, there is one 
spectrum of value, that of apparentness or appearance. How apparent 
something is depends on the extent to which we interpret it, for it is only through 
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interpretation that seeing is possible, or that ‘seeing becomes seeing something’ 
(GM III: 12). The more interpretations we entertain, the more apparent some 
object or situation becomes, and therefore the more complete our idea of it: ‘the 
more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, 
we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this 
thing, our “objectivity” be’ (ibid.). This explains why Nietzsche says that there is 
no ‘truth’ to be had in an ‘isolated judgment’ (WTP: 530), and that objectivity is 
the ability to entertain a multiplicity of interpretations, or ‘to employ a variety of 
perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge’ (GM III: 
12).
The object of interpretation is, again, the evidence of the senses. This is where 
all our evidence for truth comes from: ‘All credibility, all good conscience, all 
evidence of truth come only from the senses’ (BGE: 134). It is our senses that 
make reality, in the Nietzschean sense of the term, ‘appear’, unlike branches of 
science such as logic or maths (TI III: 3). This is because the senses are ‘subtle 
instruments for observation’, and Nietzsche says that we know only as much as 
we acknowledge of what they show us: ‘We possess scientific knowledge today 
to precisely the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the 
senses—to the extent that we have learned to sharpen and arm them and to 
think them through to their conclusions’ (ibid.). 
The aforementioned points explain why Nietzsche sees as mendacious the 
desire not to see, or interpret, what our senses show us about the nature of 
reality: ‘I call a lie: wanting not to see something one does see, wanting not to 
see something as one sees it’ (A: 55). This implies that Nietzsche identifies 
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truthfulness with the contrary desire, namely, wanting to see, that is, interpret, 
what the senses show us. The truthful man wants to see as much as possible of 
what his senses show him of reality. Consequently, the more interpretations we 
harbour, the more we become ‘master over the multiplicity of sensations’, and it 
is the drive for such mastery that Nietzsche says is synonymous with truth 
(WTP: 517). 
Thus it makes sense that Nietzsche values whatever encourages interpretation, 
and disvalues whatever arrests or discourages it. An example of someone who 
closes his mind to interpretative activity is the ‘man of conviction’ (A: 54). 
Nietzsche takes a dim view of convictions precisely because they deter 
interpretative activity, they are ‘prisons’ that constrict our view of the world, and 
overlook its rich complexity and ever-changing nature (ibid.). What 
characterises the man of conviction is that he relies on pre-existing 
interpretations and value hierarchies to guide his life: ‘Not to see many things, 
not to be impartial in anything, to be party through and through, to view all 
values from a strict and necessary perspective—this alone is the condition 
under which such a man exists at all’ (ibid.). The man of conviction is therefore 
‘the antithesis, the antagonist of the truthful man—of truth’ precisely because he 
does not want to see anything new, or rather, he does not have ‘the capacity for 
an unconstrained view’ (ibid.). In contrast, the intellectual conscience is 
something that animates the interpretative process, and therefore Nietzsche 
values it highly.
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The intellectual conscience
The intellectual conscience involves a constant sceptical or critical attitude 
towards propositions or beliefs. This attitude is characterised by ‘denial and 
doubt’, ‘scepticism’, ‘scrutiny, […] mistrust, and contradiction’ (GS: 110). It takes 
the form of a critical inquiry that knows no bounds, a relentless questioning that 
Nietzsche associates with truthfulness: ‘Truthfulness—I favour any skepsis to 
which I may reply: “Let us try it!” But I no longer wish to hear anything of all 
those things and questions that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of 
my “truthfulness”; for there courage has lost its right’ (op. cit. 51). Nietzsche 
associates truthfulness with scepticism and intellectual experimentation or 
interrogation because they open up new interpretative vistas, are an appropriate 
response to the complexity and ever-changing nature of the material to be 
interpreted, and are pleasurable in their own right: ‘to stand in the midst of this 
rerum concordia discors [discordant concord of things] and of this whole 
marvellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, 
without trembling with the craving and the rapture of such questioning […] that 
is what I feel to be contemptible’ (op. cit. 2), and ‘The joy in shaping and 
reshaping—a primeval joy!’ (WTP: 495). 
Although Nietzsche finds this questioning pleasurable, it also requires an 
inordinate amount of effort. It is far easier to believe you have secured the 
‘truth’, and cease inquiry, than to keep questioning. Such a belief arrests further 
inquiry and cedes to lazy thinking and a desire for reassurance: 
‘The view that truth is found and that ignorance and error are at an end is 
one of the most potent seductions there is. Supposing it is believed, then 
the will to examination, investigation, caution, experiment is paralysed: it 
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can even found as criminal, namely as doubt concerning truth—“Truth” is 
therefore more fateful than error and ignorance, because it cuts off the 
forces that work toward enlightenment and knowledge. The affect of 
laziness now takes the side of “truth” […] it is more comfortable to obey 
than to examine; it is more flattering to think “I possess the truth” than to 
see only darkness around one—above all: it is reassuring, it gives 
confidence, it alleviates life—it “improves” the character, to the extent that it 
lessens mistrust’ (op. cit. 452).
The spirit of the intellectual conscience crystallises in scientific methods, or 
‘strict methods of investigation’, because these involve constant and rigorous 
questioning and experimentation and therefore foster ‘distrust and precaution’ 
as a matter of course (HAH I: 633). So, notwithstanding science’s failure to 
question the unconditional value of truth and the dogged quest by some 
scientists for eternal facts or absolute truths, what Nietzsche sees as most 
valuable in science is its methods, rather than any of its so-called findings or 
discoveries. Nietzsche praises methods in various places, for example:
‘[T]he pathos that man possesses truth is now of very little consequence in 
comparison with the certainly milder and less noisy pathos of the search for 
truth, which is never weary of learning afresh and examining anew’ (ibid.);
‘for the scientific spirit is based upon a knowledge of method, and if the 
methods were lost, all the results of science could not prevent the renewed 
prevalence of superstition and absurdity’ (op. cit. 635).
‘methods, one must repeat ten times, are the essential, as well as being the 
most difficult, as well as being that which has habit and laziness against it 
longest’ (A: 59); 
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‘The most valuable insights are the last to be discovered; but the most 
valuable insights are methods […] Our objectives, our practices, our quiet, 
cautious, mistrustful manner’ (op. cit. 13); and 
‘It is not the victory of science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but 
the victory of scientific method over science’ (WTP: 466). 
What animates or perpetuates scientific method is the search for truth, a never-
ending search that ‘is never weary of learning afresh and examining 
anew’ (HAH I: 633). Consequently, for Nietzsche, ‘the fundamental secret of 
science’ is that ‘the search after truth’ is more important or worthwhile than any 
result—than ‘truth itself’ (BT: 15), in the perspectival sense I outline in the 
previous section. In placing more value on the interrogative and experimental 
process than on the results of this process, scientific method continuously 
generates new interpretations that allow us to surpass life-inimical 
interpretations and prevent new interpretations calcifying into dogma or 
superstition. This reflects Nietzsche’s valuation of truth, namely that ‘one should 
value more than truth the force that forms, simplifies, shapes, invents’ (WTP: 
602).
The proliferation of interpretations that scientific method produces broadens our 
view of reality. The broader one’s view of reality, or the more reality one 
incorporates into one’s interpretative worldview, however unpalatable or 
unsavoury it might be, the more truthful one is, and also the stronger and 
greater one is. For example, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra desires the type of person 
who has the strength of character to ‘[conceive] reality as it is’, someone who ‘is 
not estranged or removed from reality but is reality itself and exemplifies all that 
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is terrible and questionable in it—only in that way can man attain greatness’ (EH 
IV: 5). Having an intellectual conscience and upholding scientific methods 
separate the higher from the lower man, the truthful from the mendacious man, 
regardless of any other praiseworthy characteristics the former may have. 
Someone could be a genius, but if he ‘tolerates slack feelings in his faith or 
judgments’ and ‘does not account the desire for certainty as his inmost craving 
and deepest distress’, he would still be a lesser type of human being in 
Nietzsche’s eyes (GS: 2).
Therefore Nietzsche measures greatness by how much truth a person can 
tolerate: ‘How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? 
More and more that became for me the real measure of value’ (EH Preface: 3). 
What does it mean to say someone can ‘endure’ truth? In light of the preceding 
exposition, I see two aspects to this truth endurance. Firstly, I take Nietzsche to 
mean the amount of sensory evidence that someone wants to see without 
wanting to aestheticise it to make it more palatable (I elaborate this idea in 
chapter six):
‘it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it 
completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be 
measured according to how much of the “truth” one could still barely endure
—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned 
down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified’ (BGE: 39).
Secondly, I take Nietzsche to mean the extent to which someone avoids settling 
for one view, how much he can take on of the hard work of relentless 
questioning of even ‘the smallest things’ (A: 59), of making ‘every Yes and No a 
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question of conscience’, for as Nietzsche puts it: ‘the service of truth is the 
hardest service’ (op. cit. 50). To be intellectually conscientious or ‘honest in 
intellectual things’ requires a relentless fight to stop any of one’s thoughts 
solidifying into a fixed or unchallenged viewpoint. Hence Nietzsche advocates: 
‘Never keep back or bury in silence that which can be thought against your 
thoughts! Give it praise! It is among the foremost requirements of honesty 
of thought. Every day you must conduct your campaign also against 
yourself. A victory and a conquered fortress are no longer your concern, 
your concern is truth—but your defeat is no longer your concern, either!’ (D: 
370). 
Nietzsche himself has a ‘[p]rofound aversion to reposing once and for all in any 
one total view of the world’ and a ‘[f]ascination of the opposing point of view: 
refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic’ (WTP: 470). Rigid 
adherence to a single worldview is similar to harbouring faiths, convictions or 
other dogmatic views. Such views stupefy the senses, restrict the number of 
interpretations that allow us to apprehend what they show us and reflect a need 
for certainty that attests to psychological weakness and insecurity:
‘[f]anaticism is the only “strength of will” that even the weak and insecure 
can be brought to attain, being a sort of hypnotism of the whole system of 
the senses and the intellect for the benefit of an excessive nourishment 
(hypertrophy) of a single point of view and feeling that henceforth becomes 
dominant’ (GS: 347). 
The type of people who best epitomise the intellectual conscience and scientific 
method are the Nietzschean free spirits. I turn now to Nietzsche’s 
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characterisation of the free spirits to shed more light on what the intellectual 
conscience and scientific method disclose about Nietzsche’s valuation of truth.
The free spirit
It has to be said that, apart from Nietzsche himself, the free spirit is an as yet 
unrealised possibility, but Nietzsche foretells their coming: ‘Already I see them 
coming, slowly, slowly; and perhaps I am doing something to hasten their 
coming’ (HAH I Preface: 2). Nietzsche describes free spirits as ‘already a 
“revaluation of all values”, an incarnate declaration of war and victory over all 
ancient conceptions of “true” and “untrue”’ (A: 13). The free spirit is the 
embodiment of the revaluation of all values because of his experimental 
‘methods’ or ‘practices’, which are prompted by his ‘quiet, cautious, mistrustful 
manner’ (ibid.). In a nutshell, the free spirit ‘will not easily let go of the 
questionable character of things’ (GS: 375). In this way, the free spirit has ‘truth, 
or at least the spirit of truth-investigation, on his side’ (HAH I: 225). The spirit of 
truth-investigation takes the form of a rabid intellectual curiosity: ‘In the 
background of his activities and wanderings […] stands the note of interrogation 
of an increasingly dangerous curiosity’ (op. cit. Preface: 3). 
Unsurprisingly then, ‘ultimate convictions’ or ‘strong faith’ are anathema to the 
free spirit. Like a ‘“burned child”’ avoids fire, free spirits have learned to mistrust 
convictions. This is presumably because convictions have proved to be wrong, 
in the sense of being belied by the evidence of the senses, but also because 
they frustrate curiosity, discourage critical review, and preclude the feelings of 
pleasure and freedom that come from not being confined to a single viewpoint, 
not being backed into a corner intellectually speaking (GS: 375). Thus the free 
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spirit ‘delights and luxuriates in the opposite of a corner, in the boundless, in 
what is “free as such”’ (ibid.). Consequently, the free spirit is attracted to 
ignorance and uncertainty as these motivate further interrogation and inquiry. 
Certainty is repellant to the free spirits; they do not ‘prefer even a handful of 
“certainty” to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities’ (BGE: 10). The paradigm 
free spirit, or the ‘free spirit par excellence’, is strong enough not to yield to any 
innate desire for certainty, but is accustomed to hanging in suspense, in ‘tak[ing] 
leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining 
himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near 
abysses’ (GS: 347). He spurns ‘all crude, four-square opposites’ and takes pride 
in ‘reservations’ (op. cit. 375). The free spirit welcomes ‘the news that “the old 
god is dead”’, because this gives him leave to experiment with ideas and opens 
up the possibility of new interpretations, which Nietzsche sees as an 
overwhelmingly good thing: ‘our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, 
premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again […] 
all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again’ (op. cit. 343). 
Consequently, to use Reginster’s words, the free spirit’s curiosity is 
characterised by a ‘desire not for the state of knowing or being certain, but for 
the activity of inquiry, of seeking the truth’ (Reginster 2013: 457). Nevertheless, 
the free spirit desires truth as much as he desires ‘uncertainty and ignorance’, 
because his search for truth would be hollow or disingenuous without a genuine 
desire to discover it (ibid.). Yet the tendencies from which the free spirit’s ideas 
or ‘tenets’ arise—namely, engaging in free as opposed to ‘fettered’ thinking, 
valuing the search for truth more than the end result—means that the result of 
the search is qualitatively better in the sense of being ‘truer and more 
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reliable’ (HAH I: 225). Hence Nietzsche says that knowledge comes about 
precisely from ignorance and uncertainty: ‘And only on this now solid, granite 
foundation of ignorance could knowledge rise so far—the will to knowledge on 
the foundation of a far more powerful will: the will to ignorance, to the uncertain, 
to the untrue! Not as its opposite, but—as its refinement!’ (BGE: 24).
The interrogative practices and mistrustful mindset of the free spirit means that 
he does not accept dominant viewpoints without question, and as a result 
‘thinks otherwise than is expected of him in consideration of his origin, 
surroundings, position, and office, or by reason of the prevailing contemporary 
views’ (HAH I: 225). The same applies to values. Free spirits do not simply 
adopt preexisting values and their hierarchies, but are actively engaged in 
revaluing values, or re-ranking them for themselves. Nietzsche and his critique 
of the unconditional will to truth and revaluation of truth, along with all other 
values, is a case in point: ‘Toward new philosophers; there is no choice; toward 
spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite valuations 
and to revalue and invert “eternal values”’ (BGE: 203). Nietzsche says that the 
free or ‘strongest’ spirits ‘have so far done the most to advance humanity’ (GS: 
4). This is because they have undermined existing values, by ‘toppling the old 
boundary markers and the old pieties’ and creating new ones (ibid.). At the 
same time, they have propagated their interrogative practices, or ‘reawakened 
again and again the sense of comparison, of contradiction, of the pleasure in 
what is new, daring, untried; they compelled men to pit opinion against opinion, 
model against model’ (ibid.). This helps society to progress in its thinking, and 
liberates those who have the potential to become great or free-spirited 
themselves from the prevalent and prescriptive ideas and moral values that 
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stymie them. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that the overcoming of such moral 
values is a measure of the efficacy of the investigative practices: ‘Method in 
investigation is attained only when all moral prejudices have been 
overcome’ (WTP: 583).
It is important to note that the free spirit does not value the activity of truth 
investigation ascetically, for three main reasons. Firstly, this activity does not 
does not inspire revulsion towards life, but for those, like Nietzsche, who have 
the strength to undertake it, brings pleasure. For example, Nietzsche says that 
the death of God and Christian morality invokes emotions of ‘light, happiness, 
relief, exhilaration, encouragement, dawn’ (GS: 343). This is because of the 
possibilities of inquiry that arise in its wake, and there is ‘rapture’ to be found in 
questioning’ (op. cit. 2). 
Secondly, the activity of truth investigation is life-affirming. For a start, it is 
rooted in the world of sensuous experience, rather than in the so-called true 
world of being, and as such, does not slander the former world. In addition, 
interrogative activities can reawaken an interest in and enthusiasm for life. For 
example, Nietzsche admits that he finds life more attractive—in the sense of 
being ‘truer, more desirable and mysterious every year’—since he realised that 
it ‘could be an experiment of the seeker for knowledge—and not a duty, not a 
calamity, not trickery’ (op. cit. 324). Recall that Nietzsche says the free spirit’s 
curiosity is dangerous, presumably because it brings reality into closer view, 
and this could be harmful: ‘it might be a basic characteristic of existence that 
those who would know it completely would perish’ (BGE: 39). Nevertheless, this 
danger is precisely what Nietzsche sees as reinvigorating and enriching life: ‘the 
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secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest 
enjoyment is—to live dangerously!’ (GS: 283). 
Lastly, the free spirit does not undertake truth-seeking religiously, which is to 
say that he does not subordinate his whole life to it, unlike the ascetic scholar 
with his complete subservience to unconditional truth. The free spirit knows 
‘how to escape from his own virtues occasionally!’ (D: 510), and how ‘[n]ot to 
remain stuck to [his] virtues and become as a whole the victim of some detail in 
[him]’ (BGE: 41). The free spirit is not in the constant thrall of his truth-seeking, 
he is the master of it. This is what it is ‘[t]o live with tremendous and proud 
composure’ (op. cit. 284). 
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Part 2: Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Truth
Chapter 5. Two degrees of honesty: Ehrlichkeit and Redlichkeit
In this chapter, I show how the notion of honesty figures in Nietzsche’s valuation 
of truth as the driver of critical inquiry that I defended in the previous chapter. To 
do this this, it is necessary to examine which German word for honesty 
Nietzsche uses in which context, with the two main terms being Ehrlichkeit and 
Redlichkeit . As Melissa Lane points out, Nietzsche starts to carve out different 1
meanings for these terms from Daybreak onwards, with the start of his self-
professed ‘“campaign against morality”’ (Lane 2007: 28). I examine the 
instances of these terms in the published works to reveal the meanings 
Nietzsche imputes to them. I suggest that Ehrlichkeit and Redlichkeit represent 
two different degrees of honesty for Nietzsche, with the stronger form being 
Redlichkeit. What makes Redlichkeit the stronger form is its foundation in 
curiosity, specifically, the type of curiosity manifested by the free spirit. The 
Redlichen are intellectually conscientious and committed to critical inquiry, and 
therefore to truthfulness, in a way that the Ehrlichen are not. Although the 
Ehrlichen have honest intentions, they are not intellectually curious, tending to 
close their minds to whatever goes against prevailing beliefs and, in some 
cases, unwittingly deceiving themselves in a self-serving way.
Ehrlichkeit 
Ehrlichkeit comes from the root verb ehren, to honour, and therefore has 
connotations of sincerity and honourability. Ehrlichkeit is an old virtue, one 
 Less often, Nietzsche uses a third term for honesty, rechtschaffen, whose meaning, certainly 1
in The Antichrist, seems to be synonymous with redlich. See section on Redlichkeit for 
examples.
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practised by the ‘hereditary aristocracies’, originating in their need ‘to seem 
honest’ and good in order to foster ‘a feeling of trust and security [that] 
multiplied the sum of actual physical power a hundredfold’ (D: 248). The picture 
of Ehrlichkeit that emerges from an analysis of the appearances of both the 
noun and its adjectival counterpart in Nietzsche’s published works reflects these 
origins. Ehrlichkeit is honesty as a feeling or intention, rather than the honesty 
as an intellectual practice that characterises Redlichkeit. In other words, the 
Ehrlichen are only honest as far as their intentions go, insofar as they mean or 
believe themselves to be honest, rather than being honest deep down, or 
honest through and through. Therefore, as well as honest and honestly, 
Ehrlichkeit and ehrlich have been translated in the English versions of 
Nietzsche’s published works as ‘sober seriousness’ (op. cit. Preface: 3), 
‘earnestness’ (op. cit. 215) and ‘sincerity’ (op. cit. 322), and ‘honourable’ (op. cit. 
84). Importantly, the sincerity of the Ehrlichen is completely ingenuous, with 
Nietzsche describing them as ‘the simple, the pure’ with ‘innocent eyes’ (op. cit. 
543).
Nietzsche uses Ehrlichkeit and its cognates to describe the earnestness with 
which some people adhere to certain ideas, particularly religious tenets or 
conventional morals. For example, Nietzsche speaks of the ‘honesty of 
devotion’ (Ehrlichkeit der Hingebung) of committed Christians who take ‘joy in 
submission’, and who are ‘enthusiasts for humility and worship’ (op. cit. 60). 
Nietzsche also uses Ehrlichkeit to describe the sincerity with which some 
people devote themselves to being upstanding moral citizens, devotion that 
entails a good measure of personal sacrifice. At the same time, Nietzsche 
recognises that the self-sacrifice is actually a smokescreen for the feelings of 
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power and ecstasy that the Ehrlichen get from their devotion. These feelings 
derive from the thought that they are aligning themselves with the ‘powerful 
being, whether a god or a man’ to whom they are devoted, and at the same time 
they are transforming themselves into god-like beings (op. cit. 215). As these 
people are not truthful in the Nietzschean sense of being scrupulously critical or 
inquisitive, they never acquire the self-knowledge that would allow them to 
grasp the real motivation for their devotion to morality. As Nietzsche puts it: 
‘“Enthusiastic devotion”, “sacrifice of oneself”—these are the catchwords of 
your morality, and I can readily believe that you are, as you say, “in earnest 
about it” (es damit ehrlich meint): but I know you better than you know 
yourselves when your “earnestness” (Ehrlichkeit) is able to walk arm in arm 
with such a morality […] The truth of the matter is that you only seem to 
sacrifice yourselves: in reality you transform yourselves in thought into gods 
and enjoy yourselves as such’ (ibid.).
Nietzsche describes the dedication of these people as ehrlich despite the 
pseudo nature of their self-sacrifice. Nietzsche captures the same sense of 
double standards in his use of the term ‘“honest” lie (“ehrliche” Lüge)’ in GM III: 
19. In this passage, Nietzsche discusses educated, so-called good people who 
have assimilated the prevailing morality so completely and thoroughly that they 
are not even capable of being ehrlich. Hence Nietzsche remarks that ‘[t]hese 
“good men”—they are one and all moralised to the very depths and ruined and 
botched to all eternity as far as honesty (Ehrlichkeit) is concerned’ (ibid.). If such 
people told lies, they would be dishonest (unehrliche) lies, as opposed to honest 
(ehrliche) ones, because they are so self-deluded. To quote Nietzsche in full:
‘Our educated people of today, our “good people,” do not tell lies—that is 
true; but that is not to their credit! A real lie, a genuine, resolute, 
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“honest” (ehrliche) lie […] would be something far too severe and potent for 
them: it would demand of them what one may not demand of them, that 
they should open their eyes to themselves, that they should know how to 
distinguish “true” and “false” in themselves. All they are capable of is a 
dishonest (unehrliche) lie; whoever today accounts himself a “good man” is 
utterly incapable of confronting any matter except with dishonest 
mendaciousness (unehrlich-verlogen)—a mendaciousness that is abysmal 
but innocent, truehearted, blue-eyed, and virtuous’ (ibid.).
The “good people” are mendacious—cannot ‘open their eyes to themselves’—
because they do not have the self-knowledge to recognise the psychological 
roots of their moral values, specifically, their goodness. Nietzsche sees this 
goodness as originating from its very opposite, namely, vengeful feelings of 
ressentiment arising from a thwarted desire for social dominance. I explain the 
concept of ressentiment more thoroughly below. Nietzsche can be seen to 
signal the pseudo nature of the goodness by using inverted commas every time 
he mentions “good man” or “good men” in this passage. The characterisation of 
the “good men” provides a stark contrast with the noble men that Nietzsche 
describes in the first essay of The Genealogy of Morals. 
The ‘noble man’ would be capable of telling an honest lie (ehrliche Lüge), 
because, unlike the ‘man of ressentiment’, he is essentially ‘honest and 
straightforward with himself’ (GM I: 10). These characteristics are evident from 
the way in which the noble man expresses his emotions and creates his values. 
The noble man discharges his emotions when they arise, such that 
ressentiment ‘consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and 
therefore does not poison’ (ibid.). In addition, the noble man creates the value of 
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goodness ‘in advance’, rather than as a reaction to the hostility of the world, and 
‘spontaneously out of himself’, rather than out of ressentiment (op. cit. 11). The 
noble man’s honesty is also manifest in the way he satisfies his desires and 
instincts as and when he likes, disregarding ‘all social constraints’ and indulging 
in ‘murder, arson, rape, and torture’ with an ‘innocent conscience’ (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the noble man is ehrlich rather than redlich because he is not 
given to scrupulous examination of his motives for action or the source of his 
beliefs. He acts impulsively, even rashly, and unreflectingly, driven by a ‘hidden 
core’ that takes him ‘in search of spoil and victory’ (ibid.).
What marks the essential difference between the “good men”, and the noble 
men in The Genealogy of Morals and self-sacrificial people in Daybreak, is that 
the values and judgments of the “good” derive from ressentiment. In Nietzsche’s 
lexicon, ressentiment is a psychological reaction to feelings of powerlessness or 
impotence in ‘a hostile external world’ (op. cit. 10). It is a mechanism whereby 
the traditional valuations of desired but unobtainable traits, such as strength and 
superiority, and of possessed but unwanted traits, such as powerlessness and 
passivity, are inverted. For example, instead of being a contemptuous trait, 
‘[w]eakness is […] lied into something meritorious’, with ‘impotence’ becoming 
‘“goodness of heart”’, ‘anxious lowliness’ becoming ‘“humility”’, subordination 
becoming ‘“obedience”’ and ‘cowardice […] lingering at the door, […] being 
ineluctably compelled to wait’ becoming ‘“patience”’ (op. cit. 14). Nietzsche 
diagnoses ressentiment as ‘the psychological problem of Christianity’, defining it 
as the denial and condemnation of ‘the drive whose expression one is, 
continually to display, by word and deed, the antithesis of this drive’ (WTP: 179). 
For this reason, the ‘man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naive nor honest 
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(ehrlich) and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding 
places, secret paths and back doors’ (GM I: 10). To understand thoroughly the 
meaning of this statement, I now sketch the psychology of the man of 
ressentiment using the example of the ascetic priest. In doing so I am following 
Reginster in taking the priest, rather than the slave, as the paradigm of the man 
of ressentiment (Reginster 1997: 289).
The priest has a ‘deeply repressed […] vengefulness’ on account of his political 
‘impotence’ and his subordination to the ‘knightly-aristocratic’ class (GM I: 7). 
The priest’s repression of his vengefulness leads him to revalue the values that 
he would like to manifest himself, namely ‘superiority in power’ (op. cit. 5) or 
‘political superiority’ (op. cit. 6). The priest revalues such superiority as bad or 
evil, and comes to despise the characteristics that go hand-in-hand with it, 
namely, ‘victory, spoil, and seduction’ (op. cit. 8). Instead, the priest upholds the 
values of patience, humility, justice and neighbourly love. Yet the priest deceives 
himself on two counts. Firstly, not only does the priest mistakenly take himself to 
believe that superiority in power is undesirable and contemptible, but he is also 
unaware that his negative revaluation of superiority in power actually reflects a 
strong desire for it. It is the same mechanism at work in his positive valuation of 
love: 
‘One should not imagine it grew up as a denial of that thirst for revenge, as 
the opposite of Jewish hatred! No, the reverse is true! That love grew out of 
it as its crown […] driven […] by the same impulse that drove the roots of 
that hatred deeper and deeper’ (ibid.). 
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Secondly, the priest’s positive revaluation of values that are contrary to those he 
desires deep down works to partly gratify the subterranean desires. For a start, 
the priest’s overt benevolence gives him a feeling of power and superiority: ‘The 
happiness of “slight superiority,” involved in all doing good, being useful, 
helping, and rewarding, is the most effective means of consolation for the 
physiologically inhibited, and widely employed by them when they are well 
advised’ (GM III: 18). In addition, the way in which the priest explains the 
suffering of his congregation in terms of punishment for sin serves to render 
himself indispensable to them. The sick suffer with ‘the deep depression, the 
leaden exhaustion, the bleak melancholy of the physiologically inhibited’ (op. cit. 
17). The priest exploits the sick’s ‘sense of guilt’ to make them believe they are 
to blame for their condition: ‘“I suffer: someone must be to blame for it”—thus 
thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: “Quite 
so, my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this 
someone, you alone are to blame for it […]’” (op. cit. 15). 
The priest then whips up ‘orgies of feeling’ that work to deflect the suffering by 
providing a release and diversion from the negative feelings: ‘To wrench the 
human soul from its moorings, to immerse it in terrors, ice, flames, and raptures 
to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure, gloom, and 
depression as by a flash of lightening’ (op. cit. 20). However, this deflection is 
only ever temporary. It does not cure the suffering, and actually exacerbates it: 
‘Every such orgy of feeling has to be paid for afterward […] it makes the sick 
sicker’ (ibid.). The important point is that the priest promotes his ‘lies’ of guilt, 
sin, fear and punishment, not ‘with honest (Ehrlichkeit) hatred and love’, but 
from ‘the most cowardly, cunning, lowest instincts’, namely, so that those that 
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suffer are in ‘need of a priest at all times’ (A: 49). In this way, the priest obtains 
the power he unconsciously desires: ‘the priest rules through the invention of 
sin’ (ibid.). All in all, the priest, like all men of ressentiment, can be said to 
manifest ‘the counterfeit and self-deception of impotence’ (GM I: 13). The man 
of ressentiment does not recognise that he harbours desires contrary to the 
values he affirms, nor does he recognise that it is the contrary desires that lead 
him to affirm the values with which he affiliates himself. Consequently, unlike 
the noble man, the man of ressentiment does not ‘[live] in trust and openness 
with himself’ and therefore is neither truthful, nor honest (ehrlich) (op. cit. 10).
Redlichkeit
Redlichkeit, from the root verb ‘reden’, to speak or talk, has connotations of 
frankness. This is the highest order of honesty in Nietzsche’s account, and it is 
a new virtue. Nietzsche defines it as a ‘virtue in process of becoming’, as ‘the 
youngest virtue, still very immature’ (D: 456). Despite this, Redlichkeit is the first 
of Nietzsche’s ‘four cardinal virtues’ and applies to ourselves and others: 
‘Honest (Redlich) towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us’ (op. cit. 
556). Simply put, Redlichkeit is the frank and unflinching expression of reality as 
obtained through the senses, however unpalatable it may be, or, to borrow 
Lane’s words, Redlichkeit involves ‘a severe and unblinking acknowledgment of 
nature and reality, of the way things are, which does not attempt to moralise 
away suffering or harm’ (Lane 2007: 36).
Redlichkeit is closely aligned with truthfulness in the specifically Nietzschean 
sense of taking a particularly rigorous attitude to truth investigation. Alan White 
(2001: 66-72) outlines a six-stage genealogy of Redlichkeit from sections 110 
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and 111 in The Gay Science that I overview here as it is helpful in 
understanding the intimate connection between Redlichkeit and truthfulness. In 
the first stage, what White calls ‘the will to life’ dominates (op. cit. 66). This is 
the time when ‘the intellect produced nothing but errors’ (GS: 110). However, by 
chance, some of these errors enabled our human ancestors to survive. This 
included the propositions ‘that there are enduring things; that there are equal 
things’ (ibid.) It was these ideas that allowed our ancestors to quickly overlook 
subtle differences between different animals and edible plants to conclude they 
are alike and suitable for consumption. Had they not have done this, they may 
have starved: ‘Those […] who did not know how to find often enough what is 
“equal” as regards both nourishment and hostile animals […] were favoured 
with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed immediately upon 
encountering similar instances that they must be equal’ (op. cit. 111). 
In the second stage, the will to truth emerged with the Eleatics, pre-Socratic 
philosophers who ‘denied and doubted’ the aforementioned propositions and 
exposed them as ‘natural errors’ (op. cit. 110). Despite this insight, the Eleatics 
repeated the very same error by imputing to themselves the characteristics they 
had exposed as being erroneous through their invention of an ‘unchangeable 
and impersonal’ sage with ‘universality of intuition’ (ibid.). For the notion of the 
sage to make sense, the Eleatics ‘had to deceive themselves about their own 
state: they had to attribute to themselves, fictitiously, impersonality and 
changeless duration’ (ibid.). What led to the revelation of this contradiction was 
Redlichkeit, hand in hand with scepticism: ‘The subtler development of honesty 
(Redlichkeit) and scepticism eventually made these people, too, impossible; 
their ways of living and judging were seen to be also dependent upon the 
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primeval impulses and basic errors of all sentient existence’ (ibid.). At this third 
stage, the will to life and the will to truth coexist in the acknowledgement that 
some basic errors, such as notions of endurance and equality, are necessary 
for survival, but also that a recognition of differences—or in other words, 
precision and accuracy—aims at truth, and allows us to decide which of the 
propositions that represent the basic errors are more beneficial for life:  
‘This subtler honesty (Redlichkeit) and skepticism came into being 
wherever two contradictory sentences appeared to be applicable to life 
because both were compatible with the basic errors, and it was therefore 
possible to argue about the higher or lower degree of utility for life; also 
wherever new propositions, though not useful for life, were also evidently 
not harmful to life: in such cases there was room for the expression of an 
intellectual play impulse, and honesty and skepticism were innocent and 
happy like all play’ (ibid.).
In the fourth stage, the will to truth became as powerful a force as the will to life: 
‘eventually knowledge and the striving for the true found their place as a need 
among other needs’ (ibid.). Thereafter, the will to truth merges with the will to life 
as ‘a single force’ under the term knowledge, or ‘Erkenntnis’ (White 2001: 70). 
Truth-seeking ‘instincts’—namely ‘scrutiny, denial, mistrust, and contradiction’—
which were previously considered to be ‘“evil”’, attained the status of ‘good’ (GS: 
110). Nietzsche describes the merging of will to truth with the will to life in 
knowledge as follows: 
‘knowledge became a piece of life itself, and hence a continually growing 
power—until eventually knowledge collided with those primeval basic 
errors: two lives, two powers, both in the same human being. A thinker is 
now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving 
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errors clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be 
also a life-preserving power’ (ibid.).  
This fusion could only occur in a world in which God sanctified truth, or, as 
White puts it: ‘only as accuracy guaranteed by good or God to be beneficial—
could Erkenntnis as cognition of truth […] become “a piece of life itself”’ (White 
2001: 70). Therefore it is the death of God that heralds the penultimate stage in 
the development of Redlichkeit. At this fifth stage, the will to truth gains the 
upper hand over the will to life. The refinement of the intellectual conscience 
exposes religious interpretations as unsubstantiated and dishonest (unerhlich). 
Although one would expect Nietzsche to use unredlich here, given the close 
association between Redlichkeit and the intellectual conscience, perhaps he 
uses unerhlich to emphasise his view of the dishonourableness of Christian 
moral interpretation, especially as he is highlighting its pervasiveness in all 
aspects of life and nature:
‘Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and governance of a 
god; interpreting history in honour of some divine reason, as a continual 
testimony of a moral world order and ultimate moral purposes; interpreting 
one’s own experiences as pious people have long enough interpreted 
theirs, as if everything were providential, a hint, designed and ordained for 
the sake of the salvation of the soul—that is all over now, that has man’s 
conscience against it, that is considered indecent and dishonest (unehrlich) 
by every more refined conscience’ (GS: 357).
Nietzsche credits Schopenhauer and his ‘unconditional and honest (redliche) 
atheism’ with this development, saying he ‘was the first admitted and inexorable 
atheist among us Germans’ (ibid.). It is atheism that exposes the ‘lie involved in 
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belief in God’ and undermines the life-denying unconditional will to truth’s 
divine, inestimable status (GM III: 27). However, Christian interpretations 
provided life with meaning, and repudiating them raises the question of whether 
existence has any meaning. Nietzsche sees that, in answering this question in 
the negative, Schopenhauer makes the same mistake as the Eleatics. This is 
because he affirms the notion of a domain of true identities separate from 
experience and thereby perpetuates ‘those Christian-ascetic moral perspectives 
in which one had renounced faith along with the faith in God’ (GS: 357). This 
leads to the sixth and final stage, Nietzsche’s own characterisation of 
Redlichkeit, one that does not entertain the possibility of unconditional and self-
identical truths or definitive interpretations, as I have shown in previous 
chapters, but one that gives life meaning and purpose, at least for those who 
are capable of being redlich. I now turn to the detail of Nietzsche’s own 
presentation of Redlichkeit.
It is ‘honest (redliche) atheism’ that leads to the repudiation of Christian 
interpretations of life, nature and history. Unsurprisingly then, Christians and 
religious thinkers are the main group that Nietzsche deems not to be redlich. 
Examining precisely why Nietzsche rebukes Christians for being unredlich 
reveals the main characteristics of Redlichkeit. Nietzsche writes that Christianity 
does not ‘[educate] the sense of honesty (Redlichkeit) and justice’, and that 
there is a lot of ‘dishonesty (Unredlichkeit) […] still practised in Protestant 
pulpits’ (D: 84). There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, Christianity and the 
promoters of its doctrines accept and promote dogmatic biblical propositions 
unquestioningly and uncritically, and secondly, they interpret all their 
experiences along religious lines with no desire or thought to question them 
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using reason. On the first point, Nietzsche writes that Christians unabashedly 
assert religious pronouncements as being true with no shred of proof other than 
the feeling that their selflessness somehow guarantees the truth of the 
pronouncements: 
‘the Christian “But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; 
and all these things shall be added unto you” [has] never been made with 
total honesty (Redlichkeit) and yet always without a bad conscience: one 
has advanced such propositions […] boldly as the truth in the face of all 
appearance and has felt in doing so no religious or moral pang of 
conscience […] Many worthy people still stand at this level of truthfulness: 
when they feel themselves selfless they think they are permitted to trouble 
themselves less about truth’ (op. cit. 456). 
Being redlich is not to assert ‘conjectures as boldly as if they were dogmas’, but 
to be in ‘honest perplexity (einer redlichen Verlegenheit)’ about interpretations, 
including those of biblical passages (op. cit. 84). On the second point, Nietzsche 
castigates ‘founders of religions’ for lacking the ‘sort of honesty’ (Redlichkeit) 
necessary to make ‘their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge’, 
and necessary to interpret them using reason, rather than ‘against reason’ and 
in terms of ‘“miracles” and “rebirths”’ (GS: 319). Making experiences a matter of 
conscience and interpreting them using reason involves posing questions such 
as: ‘“What did I really experience? What happened in and around me at that 
time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to deceptions of the 
senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?”’ (ibid.). Some philosophers are guilty 
of a similar lack of criticality, and are wont to present as truths, what are really 
their assumptions, hunches, abstracted desires and prejudices. Moreover, they 
find post-hoc rationalisations to substantiate these ‘truths’, but are not 
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intellectually conscientious enough to recognise or admit to it. Consequently, 
Nietzsche writes that such philosophers ‘are not honest (redlich) enough in their 
work, although they all make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of 
truthfulness is touched even remotely’ (BGE: 5). 
The more redlich we are, the less we are tempted to interpret new experiences 
and perceptions in terms of regnant moral frameworks or previous experiences: 
‘As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all 
our previous experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty (Redlichkeit) 
and justice’ (GS: 114). The less redlich we are, and therefore the weaker we 
are, the more we tend to ignore or dissolve the differences between things: 
‘Those who want to mediate between two resolute thinkers show that they are 
mediocre; they lack eyes for seeing what is unique. Seeing things as similar and 
making things the same is the sign of weak eyes’ (op. cit. 228). Part of what it is 
to demonstrate Redlichkeit, to speak frankly and unflinchingly about reality, is to 
find new ways of interpreting it. As Nietzsche has Zarathustra point out: ‘Ever 
more honestly (redlicher) it learns to talk, the I: and the more it learns the more 
it finds words and honours for body and earth’ (Z I: 3). This makes sense in the 
context of Nietzsche’s views that there is an infinite number of valid ways of 
interpreting reality, and that the only way we have of apprehending reality is by 
interpreting the evidence of the senses to transform ‘seeing’ into ‘seeing 
something’ (GM III: 12).
Another major aspect of Redlichkeit is engaging in behaviour that constitutes, or 
is conducive to, truth-determination, specifically, intellectual scrutiny, critique, 
scepticism and experimentation, and avoiding the temptation to develop fixed 
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ideas or opinions, or to uphold beliefs simply because they are widely accepted: 
‘To admit a belief merely because it is a custom—but that means to be 
dishonest (unredlich), cowardly, lazy! (D: 101). Consequently, Redlichkeit 
requires one to police one’s thoughts continually by countering them with 
opposing thoughts: ‘Never keep back or bury in silence that which can be 
thought against your thoughts! Give it praise! It is among the foremost 
requirements of honesty of thought (Redlichkeit zu Denkens)’ (op. cit. 370). As 
Nietzsche writes in The Antichrist, using rechtschaffen in a sense that seems to 
me to be consistent with redlich, being intellectually honest means making any 
affirmation or denial a matter of stringent debate: ‘What does it mean to be 
honest (rechtschaffen) in intellectual things? That one is stern towards one’s 
heart, that one despises “fine feelings”, that one makes every Yes and No a 
question of conscience!’ (A: 50). 
Redlichkeit is undoubtably hard work. It takes strength of character, and 
involves treating ourselves cruelly. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, 
Redlichkeit involves going against an innate desire for certainty, a desire that 
constitutes the ‘inmost craving and deepest distress’ (GS: 2). As Nietzsche puts 
it in The Antichrist, again using rechtschaffen in a synonymous way to redlich, 
‘[o]ne must be honest (rechtschaffen) in intellectual matters to the point of 
harshness’ (A: Foreword). This desire for certainty leads weaker, less honest 
people, to all too eagerly accept something as proof of a conviction, without 
undertaking the rigorous method of scrutiny, contradiction and interrogation that 
is characteristic of Redlichkeit. In other words, those who Nietzsche sees as 
perpetuating religious and other metaphysical convictions let the strength of 
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their ‘demand that […] something should be firm’ lead them to be ‘more 
negligent about the demonstration of this certainty’ (GS: 347). 
Secondly, Redlichkeit involves going against an innate desire for the simple, 
superficial and obvious, rather than the profound and complex. The Redlichen 
seek knowledge with ‘profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness’, by overcoming 
the ‘will to mere appearance, to simplification’ with ‘a will which is a kind of 
cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste’ (BGE: 230). It is a kind of cruelty 
because ‘any insistence on profundity and thoroughness is a violation, a desire 
to hurt the basic will of the spirit which unceasingly strives for the apparent and 
superficial—in all desire to know there is a drop of cruelty’ (op. cit. 229). Such 
cruelty assumes a literal manifestation in Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the figure 
of the leech scholar. The scholar is lying in a swamp allowing ten leeches to bite 
into his arm for the sake of his conscientious study into the brain of the leech, 
and his desire to increase his knowledge on this subject. The man asserts that 
he is disgusted by ‘half measures’ and that he ‘[wants] to be honest (redlich)’, a 
quality he equates with being ‘severe, strict, narrow, cruel, unrelenting’ (Z IV: 4). 
Hence cruelty goes hand in hand with Redlichkeit, with Nietzsche writing that ‘it 
would sound nicer if we were said, whispered, reputed to be distinguished not 
by cruelty but by “extravagant honesty” (Redlichkeit)’ (BGE: 230). 
The third reason why being redlich is hard work is because the realisations that 
arise from its practice can be difficult to bear. These realisations include 
unsavoury features of human psychology and nature, as well as the ‘general 
untruth and mendaciousness’ revealed through science, and ‘that delusion and 
error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation’ (GS: 107). Nietzsche 
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believes that these realisations would ‘lead to nausea and suicide’ were it not 
for the counterforce of art, a topic I explore further in the next and final chapter. 
The upshot of all this is that many people, including religious believers and men 
of conviction, are not capable of being redlich, because the condition of their 
existence is ‘[n]ot to see many things, not to be impartial in anything, to be party 
through and through, to view all values from a strict and necessary 
perspective’ (A: 54). Such a person rejects anything that goes against 
established opinion or extant truths, ‘and tries to remove it from his mind as fast 
as he can’ (GS: 25). Moreover, he shuns the challenge of creating new truths, 
since he is in the thrall of the ‘many old ones’ (ibid.). Nietzsche therefore calls 
such people ‘[n]ot predestined for knowledge’ (ibid.). If such people did attempt 
to adopt an intellectual conscience, and subject each one of their convictions to 
rigorous scrutiny and question, it would annihilate them: ‘The believer is not free 
to have a conscience at all over the question “true” and “false”: to be honest 
(rechtschaffen) on this point would mean his immediate destruction’ (A: 54). 
Nietzsche therefore advises the redlich not to foist their realisations on people 
who are not equipped to assimilate them, as this would be a form of torture: 
‘let us act humanely with our “sense of honesty” (Sinn für Redlichkeit)—
even though we do possess in it a thumbscrew which we could fasten on to 
all those great self-opinionated believers who even now still want to impose 
their belief on the whole world and torment them to the quick’ (D: 536).
The taxing nature of Redlichkeit means that it needs to be worked on and 
maintained unless it is to either degenerate into empty posturing without the 
practices that constitute it, or give way to the desire for an easy life. On the first 
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point, Nietzsche emphasises that we are only redlich while we are doing the 
things that it takes to be redlich. We need to remain master of this virtue, as we 
do of all our virtues. In particular, Nietzsche warns against letting Redlichkeit 
degenerate into ‘our vanity, our finery and pomp, our limit, our stupidity’ and 
cautions us not to be religious about it: ‘let us see to it that out of honesty we do 
not finally become saints and bores’ (BGE: 227). If one is truly redlich, one does 
not have the time or inclination to advertise it. Nietzsche therefore advocates 
the company of men who are ‘too serious in their passion for knowledge and for 
honesty (Redlichkeit) to have time or inclination for fame’ (D: 482). In other 
words, Redlichkeit ceases where pride, vanity and boastfulness start:
‘These are beautiful, glittering, jingling, festive words: honesty (Redlichkeit), 
love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truthful
—they have something that swells one’s pride. But we hermits and 
marmots have long persuaded ourselves in the full secrecy of a hermit’s 
conscience that this worthy verbal pomp, too, belongs to the old 
mendacious pomp, junk, and gold dust of unconscious human vanity’ (BGE: 
230). 
On the second point, the redlich might be tempted to give up on Redlichkeit in 
order to make their lives easier. Nietzsche captures this idea by personifying 
Redlichkeit as weary and in need of help. Nevertheless, we must remain firm, 
Nietzsche says, and marshall our distaste for anything less than the highest 
order of honesty and curiosity: 
‘Honesty (Redlichkeit) […] let us work on it with all our malice and love […] 
And if our honesty should nevertheless grow weary one day and sigh and 
stretch its limbs and find us too hard, and would like to have things better, 
easier, tenderer, like an agreeable vice—let us remain hard […] And let us 
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dispatch to her assistance whatever we have in us of devilry: our disgust 
with what is clumsy and approximate, our “nitimur in vetitum” [we strive for 
the forbidden], our adventurous courage, our seasoned and choosy 
curiosity, our subtlest, most disguised, most spiritual will to power’ (op. cit. 
227).
Curiosity is a crucial component of Redlichkeit. This is pure curiosity, not 
curiosity for an ulterior motive, such as the desire to earn plaudits or alleviate 
boredom: 
‘Often mere amour-plaisir [love based on pleasure] of knowledge (curiosity) 
is felt to be quite sufficient, or amour-vanite [love based on vanity], being 
accustomed to it with the ulterior motive of honours and sustenance; for 
many people it is actually quite enough that they have too much leisure and 
do not know what to do with it except to read, collect, arrange, observe, 
and recount—their “scientific impulse” is their boredom’ (GS: 123). 
The curiosity inherent in Redlichkeit is the sort of curiosity manifested by the 
free spirits. This explains why Nietzsche characterises the insatiably curious 
free spirits in terms of Redlichkeit: ‘Honesty (Redlichkeit), supposing that this is 
our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits’ (BGE: 227). Free 
spirits demonstrate Redlichkeit in the intellectually conscientious way in which 
they approach the interpretation of their experiences. As Nietzsche sums this 
approach up: ‘we others who thirst after reason [and] are determined to 
scrutinise our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment—hour after 
hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea 
pigs’ (GS: 319). 
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Free spirits achieve such scrutiny by continually asking themselves difficult 
questions about the nature of their experiences. Importantly, free spirits relish 
such questions, for they are drawn to ‘everything problematic’, and take ‘delight 
in an x’ (op. cit. Preface: 3). Consequently, as soon as they answer one 
question, they immediately take up another, for ‘[a] matter that becomes clear 
ceases to concern us’ (BGE: 80). To become bored with what we already 
possess and to ‘lust for what is new’ is part of human nature, and applies 
equally to people who love knowledge and truth: ‘Gradually we become tired of 
the old, of what we safely possess, and we stretch out our hands again’ (GS: 
14). 
The free spirits would not be redlich were they not cruel with their intellectual 
conscientiousness. They do not baulk at, and are equipped to take on, any 
investigative task. Hence Nietzsche describes them as ‘investigators to the 
point of cruelty, with uninhibited fingers for the unfathomable […] ready for every 
feat that requires a sense of acuteness and acute senses, ready for every 
venture’ (BGE: 44). However, this cruelty is counteracted by the ‘great passion’ 
with which the free spirits seek knowledge (GS: 351). Without this passion, they 
would not be able to live as they do, embroiled in the thorniest of problems: ‘in 
the thundercloud of the highest problems and the heaviest responsibilities (by 
no means as an observer, outside, indifferent, secure, and objective)’ (ibid.).
The other reward for the practitioners of Redlichkeit, aside from indulging their 
passion, is to liberate themselves from the traditional moral value system of 
good and evil. For example, Nietzsche writes that ‘[i]t would mean a relapse for 
us, with our irritable honesty (Redlichkeit), to get involved entirely in morality 
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[…] We should be able also to stand above morality’ (op. cit. 107). As Nietzsche 
has the old pope point out to Zarathustra, his ‘over-great honesty (Redlichkeit) 
will yet lead [him] away beyond good and evil too!’ (Z IV: 6). In contrast, people 
who are not redlich, and who have no intellectual conscience, persist in judging 
by traditional morals, and continue ‘handling [their] scales, calling this good and 
that evil’ (GS: 2). Outside the straightjacket of traditional morality, Redlichkeit 
allows two things. Firstly, a frank acknowledgement of whatever desires and 
instincts occur naturally in us, which is not only healthy, but leads to better self-
knowledge: 
‘The realm of morality should be reduced and restricted, step by step; one 
should bring to light and honour the names of the instincts really at work in 
it […] the ever more commanding voice of one’s “honesty” (Redlichkeit) 
should shame one into unlearning that shame which would like to deny and 
lie away the natural instincts’ (1887 Notebook 10[45]).
Secondly, Redlichkeit enables its practitioners to create their own ‘valuations, 
and tables of what is good’, allowing them to judge their actions by these 
standards, rather than by someone else’s morals writ large in the form of 
‘universal law’ (GS: 335). There are two benefits to this. First, it liberates the 
Redlichen from the potentially stultifying or destructive effects of these one-size-
fits-all generalisations, or ‘recipes against […] passions’ (BGE: 198). Second, it 
is a more appropriate way of judging actions that Nietzsche sees as being 
unique and incomparable, and also unknowable. Nietzsche says that it is 
impossible to know what caused any of our actions, or in other words, ‘the law 
of their mechanism is indemonstrable’ (GS: 335). In order to create ‘our own 
new tables of what is good, and […] stop brooding about the “moral value of our 
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actions”’, Nietzsche says ‘we must become the best learners and discoverers of 
everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become 
physicists’ (ibid.). Why physicists? Because physicists engage in hypothesising 
and questioning, apply reason to solve problems, and favour this-worldly over 
metaphysical interpretations. Importantly, what inspires this mode of 
interpretative practice is nothing other than Redlichkeit: ‘long live physics! And 
even more so that which compels us to turn to physics—our honesty 
(Redlichkeit)’ (ibid.).
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Part 2: Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Truth
Chapter 6. Art versus honesty
In the previous chapter, I showed that one of the reasons why Nietzsche’s new 
virtue of honesty is hard work and involves self-inflicted cruelty is because it 
leads to realisations about existence that are psychologically difficult to bear. 
Nietzsche says that these realisations would have the potential to cause nausea 
and suicide were it not for the palliative of art. Art also enables us to affirm life 
despite these terrible realisations:
‘If we had not welcomed the arts and invented this kind of cult of the untrue, 
then the realisation of general untruth and mendaciousness that now 
comes to us through science—the realisation that delusion and error are 
conditions of human knowledge and sensation—would be utterly 
unbearable. Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now there is a 
counterforce against our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequence: 
art as the good will to appearance’ (op. cit. 107).
However, there is a concern that this vital role for art stands at odds with the 
high value Nietzsche confers on honesty and truthfulness. This is because 
Nietzsche describes art as the ‘cult of the untrue’ and ‘good will to appearance’; 
elsewhere, as ‘the cult of surfaces’, ‘falsifying [life’s] image’ and ‘the will to the 
inversion of truth, to untruth at any price’ (BGE: 59); and as something in which 
‘the lie is sanctified and the will to deception has a good conscience’ (GM III: 
25). Nietzsche refers to the artist as ‘[f]alseness with a good conscience’, 
someone who takes ‘delight in simulation’, and indulges an ‘inner craving for a 
role and mask, for appearance’ (GS: 361). In short, the problem is one of 
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reconciling honesty—with its intimate relationship with truthfulness and its 
requirement for intellectual conscientiousness—with art, which seems decidedly 
untruthful.
In this chapter, I attempt to defuse the concern that honesty and truthfulness 
clash with artistry characterised this way. I argue that honesty and artistry are 
not mutually exclusive, but compatible. That a balance can be found between 
the two is something that Nietzsche suggests in his use of the word 
‘counterforce’ in the passage from The Gay Science above. Moreover, 
Nietzsche is explicit about the possibility of a synthesis of honesty—
characterised by scientific method and truthfulness—with certain aspects of 
artistry, although he sees such a union as a long way off: ‘the time seems 
remote when artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life will join with 
scientific thinking to form a higher organic system in relation to which scholars, 
physicians, artists, and legislators—as we know them at present—would have 
to look like paltry relics of ancient times’ (op. cit. 113). Such a union would be an 
extrapolation of the coalescence, under ‘one organising force’, of the separate 
disciplines that now constitute ‘scientific thinking’, namely, ‘the impulse to doubt, 
to negate, to wait, to collect, to dissolve’ (ibid.). The toxic effect of the stand-
alone disciplines was tempered by their coalescence, implying that the harmful 
effects of honesty could be tempered by a union with artistry:
‘So many things have to come together for scientific thinking to originate; 
and all these necessary strengths had to be invented, practiced, and 
cultivated separately. As long as they were still separate, however, they 
frequently had an altogether different effect than they do now that they are 
   of  91 121
integrated into scientific thinking and hold each other in check. Their effect 
was that of poisons’ (ibid.).
I outline three principal advantages of such a union—that it allows us to remain 
honest, and therefore truthful, provide meaning for our lives, and as a result, 
affirm them. However, it is first necessary to explain why Nietzsche thinks that 
the fruits of honest investigation lead to nausea and suicide.
How honesty leads to nausea and suicide
The world that emerges from the honest interrogative practices that Nietzsche 
has undertaken is ‘in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity 
but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom’ (op. cit. 109). On this 
view of the world, the following concepts are revealed to be ‘aesthetic 
anthropomorphisms’ (ibid.), or ‘erroneous articles of faith’: ‘that there are 
enduring things; that there are equal things; that there are things, substances, 
bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is 
good for me is also good in itself’ (op. cit. 110). It is hard to renounce such 
articles of faith, partly because they enable our existence, and partly because 
knowledge of their falsity will not on its own extirpate them from our feelings: 
‘We still draw the conclusions of judgments we consider false, of teaching in 
which we no longer believe—our feelings make us do it’ (D: 99). As Aaron 
Ridley points out, such judgments still work to satisfy ‘patterns of need and 
feeling’ that knowledge of the judgments’ falsity does not change (Ridley 2007: 
75). That is not to say such a change in our feelings is impossible, only that it 
will take a very long time: ‘We have to learn to think differently—in order at last, 
perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently’ (D: 103). 
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Consequently, at least for the time being, ‘delusion and error are conditions of 
human knowledge and sensation’ (GS: 107). 
So part of the reason why honesty, and the intellectually conscientious view of 
reality it entails, would lead to nausea and suicide is that it exposes the world as 
being ‘ungodly, immoral, “inhuman”’, and that the way we have interpreted it is 
‘false and mendacious’ and ‘according to our needs’ (op. cit. 346). In other 
words, it reveals that the world can only meet our needs when mediated by 
false concepts, or as Nietzsche puts it, ‘[t]hat lies are necessary in order to live 
is itself part of the terrifying and questionable character of existence’ (WTP: 
853). Yet Nietzsche sees art providing salvation for those who understand this: 
‘Art as the redemption of the man of knowledge—of those who see the terrifying 
and questionable character of existence, who want to see it’ (ibid.).
Furthermore, ‘insight into the horrible truth’ of the nature of the world can also 
paralyse men who are characterised more by their actions than by their 
intellectual endeavours (BT: 7). A case in point is Hamlet, whose inability to 
exact revenge on his uncle is diagnosed by Nietzsche as the result of Hamlet 
having ‘looked truly into the essence of things’, and gained ‘true 
knowledge’ (ibid.). Such knowledge includes the insight that action is pointless, 
for it reveals the necessity of the way things are, that ‘their action could not 
change anything in the eternal nature of things’ (ibid.). Consequently, Hamlet, 
and the Dionysian man who resembles him, ‘feel it to be ridiculous or 
humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out of 
joint’ (ibid.). Yet artistic illusion can motivate action despite this thought. 
Nietzsche summarises the argument as follows: ‘Knowledge kills action; action 
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requires the veils of illusion […] when the danger to his will is greatest, art 
approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at healing. She alone knows how to 
turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into 
notions with which one can live’ (ibid.). In this case, Nietzsche sees art providing 
salvation for the man of action: ‘Art as the redemption of the man of action—of 
those who not only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence 
but live it, want to live it, the tragic-warlike man, the hero’ (WTP: 853). 
Lastly, the intellectual conscience has led to a lack of meaning for existence and 
suffering now that the ascetic ideal is in the process of self-destruction. Recall 
that the ascetic ideal ‘offered man meaning! It was the only meaning offered so 
far; any meaning is better than none at all’ (GM III: 28). Nietzsche asserts that 
humans have an intractable need for a meaning for existence and suffering, and 
even find suffering desirable, provided they have a good reason for it. The 
problem Nietzsche highlights is one of ‘the meaninglessness of suffering, not 
suffering itself’, for it is a lack of meaning that could lead to ‘suicidal 
nihilism’ (ibid.). More worryingly, Nietzsche diagnoses a complete lack of desire 
for meaning—as in the case of the so-called ‘last men’ presented in the 
prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra—as a sign of humanity on the wane. In 
Nietzsche’s words, ‘man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he 
exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life—without faith in 
reason in life’ (GS: 1). I say more on this matter in the section on meaning 
below. The important point here is that ‘[a] “scientific” interpretation of the world’ 
alone cannot provide meaning, for it is ‘one of the poorest in meaning’ (op. cit. 
373), and that science’s ability to ameliorate suffering is not in itself a meaning. 
As Nietzsche believes that artistic practices in their most basic conception as 
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form-creation can provide such meaning, he calls art ‘the redemption of the 
sufferer—as the way to states in which suffering is willed, transfigured, deified, 
where suffering is a form of great delight’ (WTP: 853). 
Truthfulness
Art functions to detract from ‘the terrifying and questionable character of 
existence’ (ibid.). As I mention above, we are able to aestheticise the external 
world by superimposing ‘order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom’ on the 
chaos and ugliness we see in it (GS: 109). In other words, art is able to ‘make 
things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not’, with 
Nietzsche reminding us that ‘in themselves they never are’ (op. cit. 299). As well 
as counteracting the ugliness we see in the external world with various 
aesthetic effects, we can achieve the same end by adjusting our position in 
relation to the external world:
‘Moving away from things until there is a good deal that one no longer sees 
and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see them at all; 
or seeing things around a corner and as cut out and framed; or to place 
them so that they partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of 
architectural perspectives; or looking at them through tinted glass or in the 
light of the sunset; or giving them a surface and skin that is not fully 
transparent’ (ibid.). 
Nietzsche's argument here is that ‘[t]ruth is ugly’ (WTP: 822)—with truth being 
the sight of the way things are before aesthetic effects. As his aforementioned 
comment about ‘nausea and suicide’ suggests, Nietzsche sees ugliness as 
having nefarious effects on our health and strength: ‘Reckoned physiologically, 
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everything ugly weakens and afflicts man. It recalls decay, danger, impotence; 
he actually suffers a loss of energy in its presence’ (TI IX: 20). As the 
beautifying effects of art reduce this ugliness, they counter its damaging effects: 
‘As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us’ (GS: 107). 
Consequently, Nietzsche notes: ‘We possess art lest we perish of the 
truth’ (WTP: 822). 
It is important to note that aestheticising is a response or reaction to having 
seen the world as it is, rather than something that prevents sight of it: ‘whoever 
stands that much in need of the cult of surfaces must at some time have 
reached beneath them with disastrous results’ (BGE: 59). It is because the need 
for aestheticising is a direct consequence of honesty and its unpleasant 
realisations that Nietzsche calls art ‘the good will to appearance’ (GS: 107), and 
says that ‘the will to deception has a good conscience’ in art (GM III: 25). The 
upshot of all this is that art is not a way of evading the truth, but of continuing to 
see it. As May puts this: ‘Though art is ethically opposed to truthfulness, insofar 
as it is innately fiction-creating, it is psychologically supportive of truthfulness, in 
that it enables us to live with the truth’ (May 1999: 33). To borrow Nietzsche’s 
analogy, art is to truth what sugar is to a bitter medicine (GS: 299). Hence 
Nietzsche says that we have ‘ultimate gratitude to art’ (op. cit. 107).
So Nietzsche does not advocate truthfulness at the expense of our health or our 
life. Indeed, part of the reason why Nietzsche critiques the unconditional will to 
truth is that he sees it as being inimical to life in various respects (see chapter 
two). When it comes to truth, Nietzsche says that ‘[t]he value for life is ultimately 
decisive’ (WTP: 493). For this reason, whether something is true is of secondary 
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importance to whether it benefits life: ‘The falseness of a judgment is for us not 
necessarily an objection to a judgment […] The question is to what extent it is 
life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-
cultivating’ (BGE: 4). As Christopher Janaway neatly summarises this point, 
Nietzsche sees ‘the value of truth-acquisition as conditional—on the values of 
health, strength, affirmation, or the degree of viability, bearability, and self-
satisfaction we can sustain’ (Janaway 2014: 53). Aesthetic modelling is one way 
we have of ensuring that our health is not compromised by the sight of truth, 
and another way, as Janaway notes, is to avoid looking any deeper than 
superficial appearances. Nietzsche vaunts the Greeks for being able to do 
precisely this: 
‘Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to 
stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin; to adore appearance, to 
believe in forms, tones, words—in the whole Olympus of appearance. 
Those Greeks were superficial—out of profundity. And is not this precisely 
what we are again coming back to, we daredevils of the spirit […] Are we 
not, precisely in this respect, Greeks? Adorers of forms, of tones, of words?’ 
(GS Preface: 4). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that artistic falsifications and 
appearances are not fundamentally opposed or different to reality, but a more 
refined version of it: ‘the artist places a higher value on appearance than on 
reality […] “appearance” here signifies reality once more, only selected, 
strengthened, corrected’ (TI III: 6). Nietzsche makes no ultimate distinction 
between appearance and reality, but between ‘degrees of apparentness and, as 
it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different 
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“values,” to use the language of painters’ (BGE: 34). Nietzsche’s question ‘[t]o 
what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (GS: 110) can therefore be 
understood in terms of how much truth we can stand to see without resorting to 
artistic refinement. The answer depends on how strong the person is: ‘the 
strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the “truth” 
one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one 
would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, 
falsified’ (BGE: 39). 
The stronger the person, the less aestheticising is required. Modest falsification 
is to add finishing touches to what is otherwise an un-falsified view of reality: 
‘We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off something and, as it were, 
finishing the poem; and then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry 
across the river of becoming’ (GS: 107). In this case, the concealment is partial, 
reality is still on view ‘around a corner’, in ‘glimpses’ or ‘cut out and framed’ (op. 
cit. 299). People like Nietzsche and the free spirits are even delighted and 
invigorated by the sight of truth, and do not require a great deal of aestheticising 
to counteract its effects. Nietzsche even makes it his new year’s resolution to 
not do anything more than turn away from the ugliness to achieve respite from 
it: ‘For the new year […] I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what 
is necessary in things […] I do not want to wage war against what is ugly […] 
Looking away shall be my only negation’ (op. cit. 276). 
Weaker characters need to falsify reality a good deal more, with the degree of 
falsification depending on the extent to which they have been ‘burnt’ by looking 
deeper than superficial appearances (BGE: 59). For example, artists proper can 
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be burnt to the extent that they become divorced from reality—both that of the 
outside world and of their own mental states: ‘Whoever is completely and wholly 
an artist is to all eternity separated from the “real,” the actual; on the other hand, 
one can understand how he may sometimes weary to the point of desperation 
of the eternal “unreality” and falsity of his innermost existence’ (GM III: 4). 
Religious types are in a similar position to artists, but ‘cling to a religious 
interpretation of existence’ out of a fear of truth:
‘these born artists who can find the enjoyment of life only in the intention of 
falsifying its image (as it were, in a longwinded revenge on life): the degree 
to which life has been spoiled for them might be inferred from the degree to 
which they wish to see i ts image fa ls ified, th inned down, 
transcendentalised, deified—the homines religiosi might be included among 
artists, as their highest rank’  (BGE: 59).
The so-called ‘ethical teacher’ promotes such complete and systematic 
falsifications in his instinct to preserve the human race (GS: 1). He reinvents 
reality to the extent that he no longer sees anything of it at all. This is the 
wholesale replacement of existence with a different, completely fabricated 
existence: ‘the ethical teacher comes on stage, as the teacher of the purpose of 
existence; and to this end he invests a second, different existence and unhinges 
by means of his new mechanics the old, ordinary existence’ (ibid.). Yet how 
does this degree of falsification encourage the maintenance of an honest or 
truthful approach? The answer is that it doesn’t, because these virtues are 
wholly absent. This is not ‘art as the good will to appearance’ at all (op. cit. 107), 
but the will to deception with a bad conscience, because honesty and 
truthfulness are nowhere in evidence. Nietzsche regards such people as having 
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a ‘bad intellectual conscience’ for precisely this reason (op. cit. 2). Nietzsche 
calls art ‘the good will to appearance’ to emphasise that its falsifications are to 
support the intellectually conscientious practices of honesty and truthfulness (I 
owe this observation to Ridley 2007: 80).
The other way in which ‘art as the good will to appearance’ supports truth-
seeking is by providing a more appropriate model of cognition for knowledge 
acquisition. Nietzsche believes that objective approaches encouraging the 
adoption of a perspective-free and impartial viewpoint are antithetical to 
‘scientific curiosity’ and not conducive to solving philosophical problems: 
‘All great problems demand great love […] It makes the most telling 
difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems 
and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an 
“impersonal” one, meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and 
grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought. In the latter case 
nothing will come of it; that much one can promise in advance, for even if 
great problems should allow themselves to be be grasped by them they 
would not permit frogs and weaklings to hold on to them’ (GS: 345).
What activates the intellect and allows for ‘seeing’, ‘knowing’, understanding 
and problem-solving is the engagement of as many ‘perspective and affective 
interpretations’ as possible: ‘the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, 
the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more 
complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be’ (GM III: 12). 
Nietzsche goes further and says that the psychological condition of intoxication 
is necessary for perception, as well as for pure art: ‘For art to exist, for any sort 
of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is 
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indispensable: intoxication’ (TI IX: 8). Intoxication is the byproduct of all ‘great 
desires, all strong emotions’, and is characterised by a ‘feeling of plentitude and 
increased energy’ (ibid.). As well as motivating creation and perception, 
intoxication improves certain aspects of cognition. For example, an artist in the 
Dionysian state—which, in his late writings, Nietzsche regards as the ideal 
creative or artistic state—is highly attuned to his emotions, and this improves 
his powers of representing, understanding, divining and communicating: 
‘In the Dionysian state […] the entire emotional system is alerted and 
intensified: so that it discharges all its powers of representation, imitation, 
transfiguration, transmutation […] It is impossible for the Dionysian man not 
to understand any suggestion of whatever kind, he ignores no signal from 
the emotions, he possesses to the highest degree the instinct for 
understanding and divining, just as he possesses the art of communication 
to the highest degree’ (ibid.).
Importantly, Dionysian intoxication in no way disallows honesty and truthfulness, 
as Nietzsche also uses these terms to characterise Dionysus. Dionysus is a 
‘philosopher’ with ‘explorer and discoverer courage, his daring honesty 
(gewagten Redlichkeit), truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), and love of 
wisdom’ (BGE: 295). All this suggests that artists are skilled at harnessing their 
emotions in coming up with new perspectives and interpretations, which 
Nietzsche sees as our only means of apprehending the world and attaining 
knowledge of it. 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Meaning
Aesthetic beautification is not the only type of creative practice that Nietzsche 
values. There are two other types of creation that he sees as enhancing life—
value creation and the stylisation of our characters, which Nietzsche considers 
to be ‘a great and rare art’ (GS: 290). My focus here is on value creation, 
because it is by creating new individual values that we are able to invest 
existence with meaning and affirm our lives after the intellectual conscience has 
brought about the collapse of the ascetic ideal. This collapse allows ‘the 
creation of our own new tables of what is good’ in a way that does not appeal to 
religious morality (op. cit. 335). Generating meaning through the creation of new 
values is, I contend, a more robust way of generating meaning than through 
illusions in the sense of fictional propositions about ourselves or our lives. The 
latter is beset by the problem of explaining how such propositions have the 
power to move and motivate us when we are aware of them as being fictional. 
On the other hand, it is more straightforward to see how our values causally 
influence our actions and direct the course of our lives. As Nietzsche says, ‘our 
opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good certainly belong among the 
most powerful levers in the involved mechanism of our actions’, even though 
‘the law of their mechanism is indemonstrable’ (ibid.). 
Hence Nietzsche describes values as ‘physiological demands for the 
preservation of a certain type of life’ (BGE: 3), or as a ‘standpoint’, more 
precisely, a ‘standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for 
complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming’ (WTP: 715). 
As May notes, the demand element of valuing has an objective flavour that 
determines what sort of person is suited to a certain sort of life, while the 
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standpoint element has a subjective flavour that conditions which parts of the 
world an individual sees and how they see them (May 1999: 9-10). In this way, 
the standpoint element is similar to Nietzsche’s concept of perspectivism, which 
is the process of each living organism interpreting or understanding the world 
from its own point of view: ‘every centre of force—and not only man—construes 
all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, 
according to its own force’ (WTP: 636). In short, the creation of values can be 
described as ‘the strength to create for ourselves our own new eyes—and ever 
again new eyes that are even more our own’ (GS: 143).
Aside from an unconscious or instinctual element, there are two other key 
elements to value creation (I owe this observation to Harper 2012). We need to 
both articulate and communicate the new values—‘it is enough to create new 
names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new 
“things”’ (GS: 58)—and put them into practice—‘to be something new, to signify 
something new, to represent new values’ (BGE: 253). More importantly, the 
creation of honest values requires a thorough apprehension and scrutiny of our 
experiences, making them ‘a matter of conscience for knowledge” (GS: 319), 
and diligent self-observation, asking of each of our automatic or instinctual 
judgments ‘“How did it originate there?” […] and then also: “What is it that 
impels me to listen to it?”’ (op. cit. 335).
For example, in the previous chapter, I showed how Nietzsche critiques the 
Eleatics’ values—‘their ways of living and judging’—because of the values’ 
dependence on the basic errors that the Eleatics had rejected for being wrong, 
such as the notion of enduring things, and the values’ origins in the impulses for 
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‘tranquility, for sole possession, or for dominion’, despite the Eleatics denying 
that such impulses play a part in knowledge (op. cit. 110). Nietzsche sees 
inherent in Christian values an insidious disgust with life and a desire for it to be 
over. Lastly, the slaves overlook that their values are rooted in their feelings of 
impotence and ressentiment: ‘The slave revolt in morality begins when 
ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values’ (GM I: 10). Thus 
as all these values express something quite different from what their creators 
suppose, they have a kernel of self-deception that prevents their creators from 
genuinely affirming life. However, it is essential to find the right balance of self-
reflection, for too much actually stymies creativity (I owe this observation to May 
1999: 160-161). An artist who is too busy to reflect on the value of creation 
could end up producing ‘works that far excel his own judgment’ (GS: 369). A 
case in point is Greek art and poetry, which Nietzsche says ‘never “knew” what 
it did’ (ibid.). 
Honest value-creation also requires knowledge of the natural world and human 
nature, or ‘of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world’, with 
Nietzsche remarking that ‘hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on 
ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it’ (op. cit. 335). 
Part of this is acknowledging that values that assume the status of ‘universal 
law’ are unsuitable grounds on which to judge actions that are unique and 
incomparable (ibid.). This provides an additional imperative for individuals to 
create their own values. Yet as May points out, Nietzsche does not deny that 
values can have universal applicability if they help us thrive (May 1999: 12-13). 
Self-discipline falls into this category, as Nietzsche considers it an essential 
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component in pursuing a goal or interest, which in turn, leads us to the view that 
life is worthwhile: 
‘What is essential “in heaven and earth” seems to be, to say it once more, 
that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a single 
direction: given that, something always develops, and has developed, for 
whose sake it is worth while to live on earth; for example, virtue, art, music, 
dance, reason, spirituality’ (BGE: 188). 
More specifically, self-discipline expresses ‘hatred of the laisser aller, of any all-
too-great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons and the nearest 
tasks—teaching the narrowing of our perspective’, which Nietzsche considers to 
be ‘a condition of life and growth’ (ibid.). Even obedience to Christianity, and the 
need to interpret everything according to ‘a Christian schema’, led to the 
development of ‘strength, ruthless curiosity, and subtle mobility’ (ibid.), as well 
as ‘discipline’ and ‘persistence’ (op. cit. 263). Nevertheless, at the same time, 
disciples of Christianity had ‘an irreplaceable amount of strength and spirit […] 
crushed, stifled, and ruined’ (op. cit. 188). Preventing the latter is why it is 
important for individuals to create their own honest values and ideals. Hence 
Nietzsche advises that for self-preservation and growth, values, like virtues, 
must also ‘be our invention, our most personal defence and necessity […] each 
one of us should devise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative’ (A: 11). 
To create values is also to create meaning. As Nietzsche has Zarathustra 
explain, ‘[t]he human being first put values into things, in order to preserve itself
—it created a meaning for things, a human’s meaning!’ (Z I: 15). Elsewhere, 
Nietzsche uses an analogy of the construction of a state to explicitly link the 
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creation of form—of which value-creation can be considered one type—with the 
creation of meaning. Nietzsche likens the founders of states to ‘unconscious 
artists’, whose 
‘work is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most 
involuntary, unconscious artists there are—whenever they appear 
something new soon arises, a ruling structure that lives, in which parts and 
functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a 
place that has not first been assigned a “meaning” in relation to the 
whole’ (GM II: 17). 
Meaning arises from the form and endures thanks to its position in the overall 
structure (I owe this observation to Ridley 2014: 225-226). All in all, in creating 
his own values, an individual creates goals that serve the values, or to put it 
another way, he is able to ‘out of himself posit ends’ that become ‘the ground 
and force of his being’ (A: 54). Consequently, he looks to the world to see how 
he can accomplish these ends: he ‘wants to do great things, [and] also wills the 
means for it’ (ibid.). This makes the world, or certain aspects of it, particularly 
salient or meaningful to him. The creation of values also fills the void in meaning 
that emerges with the demise of the ascetic ideal. However, Nietzsche also 
upholds value creation as a worthwhile end in its own right, a view he 
epitomises in the figure of the overman (Übermensch), who represents 
humanity at its finest. The overman invests the world with meaning after the 
death of God by creating new values—he is ‘the sense of the earth’ (Z Preface: 
3). Nietzsche hopes that others will be inspired to follow the overman’s lead, 
having Zarathustra say that he wants to ‘lure many away from the herd’ and 
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seeks ‘[c]ompanions’ or ‘[f]ellow creators […] who inscribe new values on new 
tablets’ (op. cit. 9).
Nietzsche also attempts to warm his readers to the idea of creating meaning for 
themselves by invoking the figure of the ‘last man’ (op. cit. 5; translation 
adjusted). The last man lives perfectly contentedly, with no need for ultimate 
values to provide him with existential meaning. He ‘no longer shoot[s] the arrow 
of [his] yearning over beyond the human’ (ibid.). Instead, he derives satisfaction 
from his easy, comfortable life, with the diversion of work and petty pleasures. In 
this way, the last man’s happiness is ‘contrived’ or ‘invented’ rather than 
genuine, and Nietzsche has Zarathustra describe him in unflattering terms, as 
‘most despicable human’, ‘as inexterminable as the ground-flea’ and ‘who 
makes everything small’ (ibid.). The last man does not even know the meaning 
of the word ‘creation’, and his inability to be creative will bring humanity to its 
knees: ‘the good, now “the last men,” […] are unable to create; they are always 
the beginning of the end’ (EH IV: 4). The implications are clear. Nietzsche 
believes that the ability to live without the need for meaning is not a matter of 
pride, nor, more importantly, will it allow the human race to flourish. In this way, 
the last men ‘sacrifice all man’s future’ (ibid.).
Affirmation
Artistry and honesty both play a part in Nietzsche’s value of life affirmation, 
which amounts to loving life for everything that is ‘questionable and terrible’ in it 
(TI III: 6). Nietzsche’s ideal form of life affirmation is amor fati—meaning love of 
fate—which he describes in the following terms: 
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‘My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants 
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not 
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is 
mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it’ (EH II: 10); 
and 
‘a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, 
exception, or selection […] The highest state a philosopher can attain: to 
stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for this is amor 
fati. It is part of this state to perceive not merely the necessity of those 
sides of existence hitherto denied, but their desirability […] for their own 
sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer sides of existence, in which 
its will finds clearer expression’ (WTP: 1041). 
Honesty is necessary to bring the questionable and terrible character of 
existence to light, but is not in itself an affirmative stance. In addition, as 
Anderson points out (Anderson 2005: 195), honesty’s links to ‘courage’, 
‘hardness against oneself’ and ‘cleanliness in relation to oneself’ smack of the 
life-denying asceticism of which Nietzsche disapproves in the unconditional will 
to truth (EH Preface: 3). In the quote from The Will to Power above, Nietzsche 
uses the term Dionysian to describe affirmation that incorporates honest 
recognition of what the world is necessarily like. Nietzsche applies the same 
term to the tragic artist: ‘The tragic artist is not a pessimist—it is precisely he 
who affirms all that is questionable and terrible in existence, he is Dionysian’ (TI 
III: 6). This suggests that affirmation has a specifically creative character, a 
connection that is also evident from Zarathustra’s assertion that redemption 
means ‘to work creatively on the future, and creatively to redeem—all that 
was’ (Z III: 12: 3).
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In these uses of the term Dionysian, Nietzsche has moved beyond the sense he 
gave it in The Birth of Tragedy, where he juxtaposed it with Apollonian. In this 
early work, tragedy unites both Dionysian and Apollonian forces, with the former 
exposing the worst aspects of life and the latter seducing us into affirming them 
by means of ‘countless illusions of the beauty of mere appearance that at every 
moment make life worth living […] and prompt the desire to live on in order to 
experience the next moment’ (BT: 25). Later, Nietzsche’s virtue of honesty takes 
the place of tragedy in exposing the terrible aspects of human existence, with 
affirmation deriving from creative acts, rather than passive appreciation of 
beautiful illusions. Such acts of creation can take the form of producing visual 
art or music, conceiving new values, or styling our characters. If these creative 
acts are undertaken honestly, they do not edit the ugliness out of reality, but 
expose it. Nietzsche emphasises that ‘art […] brings to light much that is ugly, 
hard, questionable in life’ (TI IX: 24). 
For example, Nietzsche says that tragic art exposes the ‘fearsome and 
questionable’, but celebrates a particular courageous and fearless response to 
it: ‘Bravery and composure in the face of a powerful enemy, great hardship, a 
problem that arouses aversion—it is this victorious condition which the tragic 
artist singles out, which he glorifies’ (ibid.). Moreover, looking at such art 
arouses a similar combative attitude in the viewer. Giving style to our character 
starts with the requirement to conduct an honest ‘survey’ of ‘all the strengths 
and weaknesses of [our] nature’ before fashioning them into ‘an artistic plan’ 
that makes even less desirable traits seem pleasing (GS: 290). Aside from 
making ourselves ‘tolerable to behold’, the aim of this stylisation is to be able to 
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affirm or ‘attain satisfaction with’ ourselves, for dissatisfaction leads to 
pernicious feelings of vengeance (ibid.).
By a process of association, art inspires others to be creative. Nietzsche says 
both that emotional intoxication motivates aesthetic activity, and that observing 
the result of such intoxication inspires the very same feeling in the observer. 
Hence Nietzsche writes that ‘all beauty incites to procreation—that precisely this 
is the proprium of its effect’ (TI IX: 22), and ‘the effect of works of art is to excite 
the state that creates art—intoxication’ (WTP: 821). This is a good thing 
because creative activity is an affirmative life force. Nietzsche says that the 
stimulation of life is the very meaning of art. An artist’s ‘basic instinct’ is ‘directed 
towards the meaning of art, which is life […] Art is the great stimulus to life’ (TI 
IX: 24). 
At the same, artistic practices provide a welcome break from the hard work that 
honesty entails, preventing us from becoming religiously or ascetically honest 
such that we compromise our health and lives. We should not ‘for the sake of 
the over-severe demands that we make on ourselves […] become virtuous 
monsters and scarecrows’ (GS: 107). To prevent this from happening, we can 
employ the artistic practices of seeing ourselves ‘from a distance' and ‘staging 
and watching ourselves’ in order to change our perspective, or break the ‘spell 
of that perspective which makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear 
as if it were vast, and reality itself’ (op. cit. 78). In other words, distance and a 
change of perspective enable us to lighten up, and not take ourselves so 
seriously: 
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‘At times we need a rest from ourselves by looking upon, by looking down 
upon, ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or 
weeping over ourselves. We must discover the hero no less than the fool in 
our passion for knowledge […] Precisely because we are at bottom grave 
and serious human beings—really, more weights than human beings—
nothing does us as much good as a fool’s cap: we need it in relation to 
ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and 
blissful art lest we lose the freedom above things that our ideal dreams of 
us’ (op. cit. 107).
Suffering is one of the terrible aspects of life with which Nietzsche is concerned, 
and it can seem as though he views creative activity as both a palliative for 
suffering and the result of it: ‘Creating—that is the great redemption from 
suffering, and life’s becoming lighter. But that the creator may be, that itself 
requires suffering and much transformation’ (Z II: 2). This is how Reginster 
reads Nietzsche (Reginster 2014). On this view, tragic art renders the terrible 
aspects of life ‘problematic’, ‘challenging’ or as resistances to overcome (op. cit. 
35). Actively seeking and overcoming challenges is part of what it is to affirm 
life, for it signals abundant energy and happiness. This is the situation of the 
‘“well-born”, who do not have to deceive themselves into feeling happy, but 
simply are happy, ‘rounded men replete with energy and therefore necessarily 
active’ (GM I: 10). As Reginster puts it: ‘happiness lies, in Nietzsche’s view, in 
the taking up of challenges, the activity of confronting and overcoming 
resistance […] the paradigm of which is creative activity’ (Reginster 2014: 35). 
Although Reginster and Nietzsche do not explicitly say so, the strong 
connection between happiness and activity is indicative of happiness in the 
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fuller sense of eudaimonia, or flourishing, rather than happiness as a feeling of 
contentment.
However, this line of interpretation justifies suffering in terms of the pleasure to 
be had in overcoming resistance, and, as May points out, there is a sense in 
which suffering does not need any justification if life is genuinely affirmed (May 
2011b). May sees the need to justify suffering as a symptom of the religious 
morality that Nietzsche wants to overcome. Questions about how to justify 
suffering are suggestive of “a will to nothingness”’—defined as ‘an aversion to 
life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life’ (GM III: 
28). This is because they signal a desire for a world that does not necessarily 
involve suffering, in other words, a world that does not exist. For this reason, the 
posing of such questions indicates only partial affirmation. To put it another way, 
inherent in the ‘will to justify’ is detachment from the object of justification, which 
allows for the possibility of not affirming it, ‘it presupposes that there is the 
alternative of saying No, even if it rejects that alternative’ (May 2011b: 86-87). 
Nietzsche shows he is thinking along these lines when he writes: 
‘The whole pose of “man against the world,” of man as a “world-negating” 
principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the 
world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it 
wanting—the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us 
and we are sick of it’ (GS: 346).
However, this also exposes Nietzsche’s earlier assertion that an honest view of 
reality would lead to nausea and suicide without the counterforce of art as 
precisely the “man against the world” position that he refutes. Such refutation is, 
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however, evident from the absence of a justificatory bent in Nietzsche’s concept 
of amor fati, and his desire to see ‘as beautiful what is necessary in things’ 
without aestheticising (op. cit. 276). In other words, the position that creative 
activity alleviates suffering is still suggestive of a desire for a world that does not 
exist, a world without suffering, which militates against wholehearted affirmation 
of life. The implication is that creative activity only demonstrates genuine 
affirmation of life when it is not motivated by a need to overcome suffering, or in 
other words, when it is the expression of someone who is not, or no longer, 
suffering, and who already fully affirms life (I owe this observation to May 2011b: 
85-86).
In conclusion, I have shown how artistry can be seen as the necessary 
correlative of honesty rather than its opponent. To borrow Anderson’s words, 
‘honesty and artistry are mutually limiting regulative ideals’ (Anderson 2005: 
206). Honesty involves taking an intellectually conscientious and truthful look at 
reality, and our perceptions and experiences of it, but it is extremely taxing. 
Artistry allows us to maintain our honesty to the extent that our health and lives 
require. Art’s emotion-driven model of cognition also hones our perceptive 
powers. In its most basic conception as form-creation, individuals create new 
values that give meaning to their lives, plugging the void left by the collapse of 
the ascetic ideal. At the same time, Nietzsche sees a lack of desire for meaning 
as contemptible, and as presaging the decline of humanity. Moreover, creative 
activity that honestly acknowledges the ugly and terrible elements of existence 
is an expression of life affirmation. In this paradigm of genuine life affirmation, 
suffering does not arise as a problem, and existence stands in no need of 
justification.  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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have undertaken a thorough survey of Nietzsche’s critique of the 
unconditional will to truth, and offered an interpretation of his subsequent 
revaluation of truth. In the first part of the thesis, I thoroughly explicated all the 
senses of the unconditional will to truth, and explored Nietzsche’s reasons for 
calling it into question. I then reconstructed Nietzsche’s account of how the 
unconditional will to truth originated and developed, and elucidated the 
substance of his critique. In the second part of the thesis, I focused on 
Nietzsche’s revaluation of truth. I argued that Nietzsche values truth principally 
as the driver of critical inquiry, the sort of inquiry that overturns life-inimical 
beliefs and prevents the formation of new dogma. I demonstrated the 
importance of honesty for Nietzsche’s valuation of truth, explored the 
relationship between honesty and truthfulness, and expounded honesty’s 
salient features. Finally, I showed how honesty can be reconciled with the 
artistic practices that Nietzsche sees as providing its counterforce, and how 
these practices help perpetuate truthfulness. I now tie together strands from the 
preceding chapters to provide a comprehensive overview of Nietzsche’s inquiry 
into the value of truth.
Nietzsche’s critique of the unconditional will to truth is bound up with his 
condemnation of Christian morality. Nietzsche recognises that what underpins 
and justifies the unconditional will to truth is God, for ‘God is the truth’ and 
therefore ‘truth is divine’, and must be upheld whatever the consequences (GS: 
344). These consequences prove catastrophic for Christian morality. As the 
moral imperative to tell the truth evolves into the intellectual conscience, the 
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very notion of God comes to be rejected for being, at best, unproven, at worst, 
untrue. The death of God, or the rise of scientific atheism, brings about the 
collapse of the entire Christian interpretative system, for ‘Christian morality […] 
stands or falls with the belief in God’ (TI IX: 5). As Nietzsche sees it, the death 
of God means that one cannot help oneself to any part of Christian morality, and 
so the unconditional will to truth has repudiated its own justificatory backbone. 
Thus there is an inevitability about the collapse of ‘Christian truthfulness’, whose 
last vestiges Nietzsche sees lingering in science as the discipline’s driving 
value, for in the end, ‘[a]ll great things bring about their own destruction through 
an act of self-overcoming’ (GM III: 27). Thus the time is ripe for a critique of the 
unconditional will to truth. Nietzsche takes on the task of revaluing the 
unconditional will to truth, questioning whether it should indeed have 
unconditional value. 
Nietzsche’s answer is that valuing truth unconditionally is both inimical and 
slanderous to life. Inimical, because Nietzsche sees that untruth has just as 
much pragmatic benefit for life as truth. Conceptual falsifications are necessary 
for us to make sense of the overwhelming chaos of our sensory experience and 
forge a comprehensible and habitable world for ourselves. Aesthetic 
falsifications are necessary to prevent the ugliness of reality damaging our 
health and depleting our strength. Slanderous, because the unconditional will to 
truth devalues our world in favour of a world of truth, a world of uniformity, 
permanence and stability, a world that does not exist. The stuff of life is 
‘semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives 
and error’ (BT: 5). These are things the unconditional will to truth would have us 
reject wholesale, and thereby abolish life itself.
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The world as Nietzsche sees it is an ever-changing and chaotic mass of power, 
‘a monster of energy’, an ‘iron magnitude of force’ (WTP: 1067). There is 
nothing unconditional about the world, there are no things-in-themselves. The 
relationships between things are only ever conditional and temporary, qualities 
that also apply to our needs and judgments. The world’s ‘rich ambiguity’ means 
that there are an infinite number of ways of interpreting it, with no single 
interpretation capable of capturing even a fraction of the whole (GS: 373). The 
more interpretations we entertain to make sense of the world, the better, for 
interpretations are the only way we glean anything, and the only way we can 
judge them is by pitting them against each other.
What encourages the generation and comparison of interpretations is the 
intellectual conscience, an attitude of critical inquiry and scrutiny that resists any 
desire for certainty. Ceding to such desire testifies to weakness, to the need for 
‘a support, a prop’ (op. cit. 347). Nietzsche sees the intellectual conscience 
formalised in scientific methods, the secret bullet of science. These methods 
counter ‘the Christian instincts’ that still fester inside us (A: 59), and ward off 
dogmatism. Dogmatism does not admit of the world’s conditionality and multiple 
interpretability, and at the same time, it paralyses the drives for inquiry and 
investigation. Similarly, the notion of truth, in the absolutist sense of the term, 
arrests knowledge-directed cognition, namely, ‘the will to examination, 
investigation, caution, experiment […] forces that work toward enlightenment 
and knowledge’ (WTP: 452).
I contend that it is as the driver of critical inquiry or investigation that Nietzsche 
values truth. Nietzsche values the methods that enable such inquiry over its 
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results. It is methods that overturn life-inimical judgments and interpretations, 
and prevent new ones calcifying into dogma. In other words, methods ‘prevent 
the renewed prevalence of superstition and absurdity’ (HAH: 635). To put it 
succinctly, Nietzsche seems to value truthfulness more than truth per se. This 
makes sense in light of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as replaceable and 
perspectival interpretations, rather than timeless and objective reflections of the 
world’s essential character.
Honesty (Redlichkeit) is an integral part of truthfulness, and one of Nietzsche’s 
cardinal virtues. Honesty entails intellectual conscientiousness to the point of 
harshness. The honest do not accept any proposition unquestioningly, and are 
critical about the nature of their experiences. They make each of them ‘a matter 
of conscience for knowledge’ (GS: 319), rather than automatically interpreting 
them in terms of regnant moral or interpretative frameworks. Honesty is 
characterised by a ‘deep’ and unflinching look at reality, and recognition of the 
need for falsifications to survive it. Hence Nietzsche describes mendaciousness 
as the desire not to see reality as it is, and by implication, honesty as the 
contrary desire. The honest resist any desire to adhere to a superficial view of 
reality, and their deep view leads them to certain unpleasant realisations about 
the nature of human existence.
Nietzsche sees art as mitigating both the unpleasant realisations that honest 
practices throw up, as well as providing respite from the taxing nature of these 
practices. Art is the ‘good will to appearance’ that staves off the nausea and 
suicide that honesty would entail (op. cit. 107). Nietzsche’s vision for the final 
self-overcoming of Christian morality is a union of artistic practices and scientific 
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methods, with art acting as ‘a necessary correlative of, and supplement for 
science’ (BT: 14). Art allows the honest (Redlichen) to aestheticise the ugly 
aspects of existence that scientific methods reveal, to the extent their health 
requires, thereby helping perpetuate their truthfulness. It also allows them to 
harness their senses and emotions in creating new interpretations, a model of 
cognition that Nietzsche sees as more conducive to problem-solving than 
scientific detachment. Moreover, the creation of personalised values invests life 
with meaning after the demise of the ascetic ideal, compensating for scientific 
interpretations’ inherent lack of meaning, and allowing mankind to thrive. So 
long as it is in its guise as the good will to appearance—as a supplement rather 
than a substitute for honest practices—art, and creative activity more generally, 
is the expression of genuine life-affirmation.
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